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Applying the perspectives of law, technology, and economics,
this article explores the privacy concerns arising from the ability
of search engines and web domain owners to indiscriminately
track an individual’s health-related internet searches. Using the
hypothetical example of a forty-year-old woman diagnosed with
high cholesterol who turns to Google to begin gathering data
about her condition and her treatment options, this article
discusses the many ways in which technology can be used to
gather, store, aggregate, and track an unsuspecting user’s healthrelated searches as she surfs the web for information. From an
economic perspective, financial incentives abound for those who
conduct business by compiling these various bits of information on
consumers through their internet activities. Having laid this
foundation, this article then explores what legal protections exist
under current privacy law to protect computer users from such
intrusions. Finding a distinct lack of protection in the law, this
article concludes with a recommendation that Congress take
legislative action targeted specifically at protecting such healthrelated inquiries.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider this scenario: Pamela, a forty-year-old female, is
informed by her doctor that she has high cholesterol and is at high
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risk for coronary artery disease. If she is like many other
individuals in today’s world, she will soon log on to her computer
to conduct Google or other internet searches1 using terms such as
“women and high cholesterol,” “cholesterol-lowering drugs,” and
“coronary artery disease” to learn more about her new health
concern. As she searches, there is a high likelihood that her queries
are being tracked.2 Due to advances in tracking technologies and
data mining capabilities, simply conducting searches increases the
probability that these searches can be traced back specifically to
her.3 Early tracking capabilities, such as cookies, were used as
benign text files placed on users’ computers to facilitate
information transfers, such as keeping track of items in an online
shopping cart.4 Newer, more intrusive, third-party tracking
technologies place files on or send a script to users’ computers.5
These trackers are designed to gather information on website
users’ behaviors across internet domains.6 And although third-party
tracking is often fragmented and messy, data mining and data
warehousing can improve the quality of this tracking data by
connecting it to additional information gathered, such as a user’s
IP address, location, name, or associations in their social

1

See Ryan W. White & Eric Horvitz, Experiences with Web Search on
Medical Concerns and Self Diagnosis, AMIA ANN. SYMP. PROC. 696 (finding
that “wealth of medical information on the Web makes it convenient for nonexperts to conduct their own diagnosis and healthcare assessment based on
limited knowledge of signs, symptoms, and disorders.”).
2
See Greg R. Notess, Tracking Your Search History, ONLINE (Mar./Apr.
2006), http://www.infotoday.com/online/mar06/OnTheNet.shtml (explaining
that the personalization enabled by consumer tracking in search engines “offers
the opportunity to build user loyalty by more effectively targeting advertising
and search results. The personalization features include such options as saving
URLs, archiving pages, organizing saved results into folders, blocking specific
sites, and recording a search history.”).
3
See Jonathan R. Mayer & John C. Mitchell, Third-Party Web Tracking: Policy
and Technology, PROC. 2012 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 413, 415
(2012), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/publication/files/trackingsurvey12.pdf.
4
See David M. Kristol, HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and Politics, 1
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 151, 152–54 (2001).
5
See Mayer & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 421.
6
See id. at 415.
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networks.7 This aggregated information is then purchased by
companies that use the information gleaned from online activity to
effectively sort individuals by certain characteristics, customize
goods and services, and even engage in price discrimination.8
Given today’s technology, such a consequence is more than
just a mere possibility. Consider, for example, a change Google
made to its privacy policy in June of 2016. As part of the
company’s plan to create more robust consumer profiles, Google
“asked users to accept a new policy that would allow them to more
easily see—and delete—the information Google holds about
them.”9 This included giving Google permission to combine
information on the individual’s Google searches and email with
information on the individual’s browsing history.10 This new policy
marked a drastic departure from Google’s nearly ten-year-old
policy of separating data from search, email, and its DoubleClick
business (DoubleClick is a subsidiary of Google that develops and
provides Internet advertising delivery services).11 In December of
2016, two U.S. privacy advocacy groups filed a complaint against
Google with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in response
to this policy change.12 In their complaint, the privacy advocates
alleged that
Google took affirmative steps to conceal and downplay the significance
of this transformational change that eliminated the barrier between the
data that Google gathers from cookies that track users’ behavior and the
personal information that Google holds from its users’ accounts.
Google induced users to accept the change to its privacy policy by
cloaking it in an offer to enable ‘new features’ that purport to provide
7

See id.
See Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman & Kimberly Meltzer, Open to
Exploitation: America’s Shoppers Online and Offline, A Report from the
Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania (2005)
(suggesting that it is “a complex mix of ignorance and knowledge, fear and
bravado, realism and idealism that leaves most internet-using adult American
shoppers open to financial exploitation by retailers.”).
9
Natalia Drozdiak & Jack Nicas, Google Privacy-Policy Change Faces New
Scrutiny in EU, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/oracleexpresses-concern-to-eu-over-google-privacy-policy-1485263548.
10
See id.
11
See id.
12
See id.
8
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‘more control’ over users’ personal information. Unsuspecting users
accepted Google’s offer in droves.13

Such actions beg the question of whether a normal citizen like
Pamela should have a reasonable expectation of privacy as she
surfs the web to gather information about high cholesterol. If so,
what is the extent of reasonable privacy protection?
To begin, many scholars have noted the difficulty in defining
“privacy.”14 Fundamentally, “the desire for privacy is an innate
aspect of human nature. For that reason, many have found that the
most productive and credible way of justifying privacy is as a
natural right aspect of human dignity.”15 Some philosophy scholars
have argued that “there is no overarching concept of privacy but
rather several distinct core notions that have been lumped
together.”16 Some have defined privacy in freedom-based terms:
[t]he right to privacy is an integral part of our humanity; one has a
public persona, exposed and active, and a private persona, guarded and
preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our lives
shall become public and which parts we shall hold close.17

Others have attempted to clarify this murky area by defining
three categories or “clusters” of privacy: spatial privacy (involving
a person’s solitude and freedom from physical invasion),
decisional privacy (involving the freedom to make certain
decisions without interference), and informational privacy
(involving the ability to determine the conditions under which
others receive information about oneself).18 While these spheres
are not “sharply separate,” they are helpful distinctions for

13

Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief at 2 (Dec.
16, 2016), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/ftc_google_complaint_125-2016docx.pdf.
14
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088
(2002).
15
Samuel P. Winch, Moral Justifications for Privacy and Intimacy, 11 J.
MASS MEDIA ETHICS 197, 198 (1996).
16
Adam D. Moore, Privacy: Its Meaning and Value, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 215, 215
(2003).
17
Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).
18
Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 845 (2002).
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discussing possible privacy protection schemes.19 Our analysis is
limited to informational privacy.
In light of the increasing potential of technology to infringe
upon an individual’s informational privacy, especially with regard
to health-related information, and the potential economic
implications of such infringement, this paper explores the legal
protections of an individual’s right to privacy and proposes
legislative action to limit industries’ abilities to continue
indiscriminate tracking and aggregation of individual healthrelated information. Part I of this Article provides a discussion of
the technological possibilities and realities of the 21st century, and
how technologies are used to gather, sort, aggregate, and store user
information. Part II offers a description of the economic
motivations behind the tracking and collection of user data.
Advances in technology have given rise to new online
intermediaries, such as online advertisers and price aggregating
and comparison sites, that create and use platforms to add user
value and create exploitative profit opportunities. However, these
activities have significant implications for consumer privacy. Part
III traces the legal history of user data protection and examines the
current state of protection at both the federal and state levels. Part
IV considers whether the tracking and aggregation of user
information in the context of health-related issues should be
subject to special scrutiny. Moreover, the section asks whether the
current methods for tracking, collecting, and storing health-related
user search inquiries violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the
privacy protections provided by the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). Part V concludes that industry
self-regulation alone is not adequate to protect against abuses of
user informational privacy and proposes federal legislation limiting
the ability of third-party trackers to gather and aggregate healthrelated data.

19

Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1203 (1998).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF ONLINE TRACKING TECHNOLOGY AND ITS
INCREASING IMPOSITION ON PRIVACY
How a business initially obtains a user’s information should be
a key factor when considering the potential privacy harms of
commercial data aggregation and analysis.20 Arguably, there is a
distinction among a user’s privacy expectation in information
voluntarily given, such as on a survey, transactional information a
company gleaned from an online purchase, and data collected
about a user’s online searches, such as in the opening scenario.
A. First-Party Tracking and Consumer Privacy
Most website owners directly collect, track users’ behaviors,
and store personal identifiable information (“PII”) and nonpersonal identifiable information (“Non-PII”) on visitors using
different mechanisms. According to the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, [P]II is:
any information about an individual maintained by an agency,
including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
individual’s identity, such as name, social security number, date and
place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any
other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as
medical, educational, financial, and employment information.21

20

A fascinating point of law tangentially related to the topic of this article is
whether and to what extent the government is permitted to access and use
information voluntarily transmitted by a business about a citizen. In United
States v. Miller, Justice Powell wrote for the majority:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), superseded by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act
of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1978).
21
Erika McCallister et al., Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality to
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS
AND TECHNOLOGY (Apr. 2010), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-122.pdf.
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In contrast, non-PII is data that cannot be solely utilized to
identify or trace a person.22 Traditionally, examples include device
IDs, IP addresses, and cookies; however, the distinction between
PII and non-PII has become increasingly blurred.23 This is the
essence of first-party tracking: a website (Internet domain) owner
directly collects information on everyone visiting their website. In
this context, “first-party” refers to which organization or website is
doing the tracking and “tracking” refers to the mechanism used to
collect the user information. In the context of Pamela, the fortyyear-old woman diagnosed with high cholesterol, her internet
search would result in Google storing a small text file, called a
“first-party cookie,” on her computer that uniquely identifies her
browser or her device, distinguishes it from other users, and
identifies how she interacted with the Google search engine.24
Here, Google is the first party, and its tracking mechanism is the
cookie it places on Pamela’s computer. By tracking and identifying
users, website owners create and update user profiles.
The most elementary form of first-party tracking occurs when a
user creates a profile through a user account with a website owner
22

See Mark H. Rosenbaum, Identifying Unethical Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) Privacy Violations Committed by IS/IT Practitioners: A
Comparison to Computing Moral Exemplars (Feb. 2015) (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Nova Southeastern University), http://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis_etd/29.
23
See Massimiliano Pappalardo, Personal Data or Non-Personal Data That Is
the Question! The Different Interpretations of ECJ and Italian Supreme Court,
(Oct. 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=804ce9b8-dfa54c67-bbf7-4cc3e087c2f8. Note, PII is a term used primarily within the United
States, whereas the term personal data is the European equivalent to PII, with
some caveats. The EU directive 95/46/EC defines personal data as:
Article 2(a): ‘personal data’ shall mean any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular,
by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural, or
social identity.
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 2(a).
24
Google Analytics, Google Analytics Cookie Usage on Websites,
https://developers.google.com/analytics/devguides/collection/analyticsjs/cookieusage (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
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and logs into their account to access that website. As part of the
account set-up process the website owner may ask for various
pieces of information, such as name and contact information, and
when users voluntarily reveal this identifying information, tracking
related to such disclosures is explicit. For example, our forty-yearold woman may have voluntarily created a Google account and
may have been signed into it when she conducted an internet
search for “women with high cholesterol.” By providing her name,
date of birth, gender, mobile phone number, email address and
location, Google will give her access to other services it offers and
will provide a secure, more personalized experience. Information
disclosures such as these permit users to gain access to additional
content or website features in exchange for personal (or
clickstream) information that website owners can use.25
While personal online profile accounts or profiles permit
explicit first-party tracking, there are many examples of website
owners that use implicit first-party tracking mechanisms. These
commonly-used computer browser-based tracking mechanisms
include: 1) Hypertext Transfer Protocol (“HTTP”) cookies,26 2)
Internet Protocol (“IP”) address identification,27 and 3) browser
fingerprinting.28
While the Internet is a networking infrastructure consisting of
networks of networks, the Web—or World Wide Web—is the
25

Clickstream information is a series of mouse clicks made while accessing
one or more websites. See Randolph E. Bucklin & Catarina Sismeiro, Click
Here for Internet Insight: Advances in Clickstream Data Analysis in Marketing,
23 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 35, 35–37 (2009).
26
David Kristol & Lou Montulli, HTTP State Management, Request for
Comments (Oct. 2000), https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2965.txt.
27
Client IP addresses are logged as part of standard practice by web servers so
that Internet domain owners know basic information about clients who have
accessed content hosted on their servers. When combined with other information
in a standard log entry, e.g. a timestamp, a reverse DNS lookup of the IP
address, the client TCP port number, the identity of the client device can be
determined. For a description of a standard log entry, see the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) Extended Log File Format, https://www.w3.org/TR/WDlogfile.html.
28
Peter Eckersley, How Unique Is Your Web Browser?, INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES SYMPOSIUM 1, 1–18 (Jul.
2010).
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protocol for accessing information (websites) over the Internet.
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is the dominant
application layer protocol for data communication over the Web.
Originally, HTTP was designed as a stateless protocol; meaning
that each user’s request to a website is treated independently of
previous requests from the same user.29 The implication is that
websites and their applications cannot track user configuration
settings or retain transaction information between sessions or web
pages. This feature of the HTTP protocol severely limits the
potential usefulness of the World Wide Web and the Internet. For
example, a stateless protocol would preclude a website from
remembering what an online shopper had added to their shopping
cart.
To overcome the stateless feature of HTTP, websites send and
store small text data files, called HTTP cookies, on a user’s
computer via the internet browser while a user is browsing.30
HTTP cookies were designed to maintain state information
between a user and websites she has visited, such as remembering
items added to a shopping cart in an online store and browsing
activities across pages maintained by a website owner. In addition
to maintaining state information, HTTP cookies remember other
pieces of information that a user may have entered on a website
owner’s pages like passwords and credit card numbers.31 Cookies
play an important role in how modern websites work. Their
management of state by the web browser and web server provides
a convenient and reliable way of remembering things such as
where a user left off the last time she visited a site and any user
preferences.32 To maintain state information, a website “sets” a
cookie in a user’s browser. The information encoded in the cookie,
the use of the cookie by the website owner, and the ability to link
the cookie with other information all generate privacy concerns.33
29

See Ray Fielding, Jim Gettys, Jeff Mogul, Henrik Frystyk, Larry Masinter,
Paul Leach & Tim Berners-Lee, Hypertext Transfer Protocol—HTTP/1.1,
Request for Comments (Jun. 1999), https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt.
30
See Kristol, supra note 4, at 153.
31
Id. at 155.
32
Id.
33
Id.

OCT. 2017]

Health Privacy

11

Two common types of first-party HTTP cookies are session
cookies and persistent cookies.34 A session cookie is a temporary
text file that is removed from the computer user’s cache memory
when the web browser closes. The purpose of a session cookie is to
store state information only while a user visits a website. In regards
to consumer privacy concerns, session cookies are the most benign
first-party tracking technology since they are deleted once the
browser session is terminated and are not used for tracking over
time or across websites. In contrast, a persistent cookie is a small
text file placed on a computer that remains in a browser’s data
storage so that the cookie communicates its information to the
website upon every visit. Persistent cookies expire either on a
specific date or after a specific length of time.35 The enduring
nature of persistent cookies enables users to remain logged into a
website for a period of time and store information on behalf of the
website owner. It also permits a website to track a user’s behavior
while visiting the pages on its website. Despite the upside of
facilitating interactions and improving users’ experiences,
persistent cookies are more invasive in terms of privacy since
websites can learn about users’ behavior and potentially use that
information in ways that could be harmful to the consumer.36
While users can set browser settings to disable cookies or easily
remove them from their computers, a new class of cookies has
been developed that cannot easily be deleted.37
34

See Nicholas C. Zakas, HTTP Cookies Explained, NCZONLINE (May 5,
2009), https://www.nczonline.net/blog/2009/05/05/http-cookies-explained/ (last
visited Sept. 17, 2017). By default, “a cookie has a lifespan of a single session.
A session is defined as finished when the browser is shut down, so session
cookies exist only while the browser remains open.” Id. For a cookie to persist
on a client device after a browser is shut down, the default behavior can be
modified by setting an expiration date and time for a cookie, which specifies
when the cookie “may be deleted by the browser.” Id. Therefore, a persistent
cookie is stored on the client device until it expires.
35
MDN TECHNOLOGIES, HTTP Cookies, https://developer.mozilla.org/enUS/docs/Web/HTTP/Cookies (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
36
See infra Part II.
37
This new class of cookies is called evercookies or zombie cookies that are
persistent and cannot be (easily) deleted. See Jacqui Cheung, Zombie Cookie
Wars: Evil Tracking API Meant to Raise Awareness, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 22,

12
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Browser fingerprinting and Internet Protocol (“IP”) address
tracking are two other commonly used implicit, first-party tracking
mechanisms, which differ from HTTP cookies in that they are
stateless.38 Unlike persistent cookie technology that can be used to
identify and track users’ online behavior over time on a particular
website, browser fingerprinting relies on a combination of user’s
browser and computer configuration that the website can retrieve
with each visit.39 Individually, the identifiers within a “fingerprint”
are incapable of identifying a specific individual. However, the
personal-identification power is derived from examining these
identifiers collectively. The chance that two individuals have the
exact same settings and specifications is only one in several
million individuals.40 Browser fingerprinting is viewed as the most
invasive violation of consumer privacy because: 1) it is virtually
impossible for users to detect; 2) it is difficult to prevent; and 3) it
is semi-permanent.41 Although not as invasive as browser
fingerprinting, IP address tracking is another first-party tracking
mechanism that facilitates individual- or household-level
identification and tracking, and it can be technically difficult for
lay users to prevent. Each computer or router connects to the
Internet using an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), who assigns

2010), https://arstechnica.com/business/2010/09/evercookie-escalates-the-zombiecookie-war-by-raising-awareness/.
38
Browser fingerprinting and IP address tracking can also be used as third-party
tracking technologies. See NPR Staff, Online Trackers Follow Our Digital
Shadow by “Fingerprinting” Browsers, Devices, NPR (Sept. 16, 2016, 5:58 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/09/26/495502526/onlinetrackers-follow-our-digital-shadow-by-fingerprinting-browsers-devices.
39
The collected information is extensive and typically includes: browser type
and version, the computer operating system and version, screen resolution,
supported fonts, plugins, time zone, language, font preferences, and sometimes
other hardware configurations. See Lance Cottrell, Browser Fingerprints, and
Why They Are So Hard to Erase, NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 17, 2015, 6:22 AM),
https://www.networkworld.com/article/2884026/security0/browser-fingerprintsand-why-they-are-so-hard-to-erase.html.
40
This statistic suggests that browser fingerprinting is a highly successful
individual-identifying mechanism. Id.
41
Id.
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each computer or router a unique IP address.42 By itself, an IP
address does not contain any personally identifiable information;
however, a website can identify a user’s IP address, which can
reveal the user’s geographical region.43 The implication is that a
website can, with some degree of accuracy, link an IP address to an
individual user.44
B. Third-Party Tracking
In contrast to first-party tracking technologies, the common
elements of third-party tracking technologies are twofold: 1) the
mechanism is initiated by a party other than the website owner and
2) the technologies can identify, collect, store, and aggregate
personal and non-personal information about a user over time and
across websites. Third-party tracking technologies can be used
when a website partners with an advertising network to populate
blank ad-space or partners with an analytics company to better
understand users’ behaviors. Pamela may visit a website to
research the health implications of her high cholesterol and
encounter an advertisement that relies on third-party tracking
technology to deliver the advertisement based on certain personally
identifiable and non-personally identifiable user information, for
example, her age, gender, browsing history, or search history.
There are many different third-party tracking technologies.
Broadly, these are categorized as “stateful” and “stateless”
technologies. Stateful third-party tracking technologies, such as

42

PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, Online Privacy: Using the Internet
Safely, PRC, https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/online-privacyusing-internet-safely (last visited Sept. 6, 2017).
43
There are two possible weaknesses in an ISP assignment of IP addresses: 1)
ISPs’ privacy policies vary considerably and may disclose an individual’s or a
household’s IP address and 2) ISPs assign IP addresses based on geographical
location and the specificity of that assignment varies with ISP. Id.
44
Why IP Tracking Is a Bad Idea, AD EXCHANGER (Jul. 30, 2010, 12:09 AM),
https://adexchanger.com/the-debate/why-ip-tracking-is-a-bad-idea/ (discussing a
2010 test that revealed the ability of IP addresses to accurately identify about
thirty percent of U.S. households).

14
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third-party cookies, use a variety of technologies, including many
of which fall under the umbrella term of supercookies.45
Like a first-party cookie, a third-party cookie is a small file
residing on a website user’s computer that identifies personal and
non-personal information. However, unlike a first-party cookie, the
origin of the third-party cookie is a website other than where a user
is currently visiting. For example, if Pamela visits an information
content provider’s website, like WebMD.com, and encounters an
advertisement for a cholesterol-lowering drug, like Repatha, and
she clicks on the advertisement and is redirected to a nonWebMD.com website, then a third-party cookie may have been
used in the redirection process. A third-party cookie was likely
used to help identify (based on her personally identifiable and nonpersonally identifiable information) with what advertisement to
populate the ad space on WebMD.com, and where to redirect the
user as she clicked on the ad. Third-party cookies have the benefit
of maintaining a stateful relationship with the user and the first
party, thereby permitting third parties to identify, collect, store, and
aggregate information about specific users over time and across
different websites.46
Some types of supercookies place small files on a user’s
computer to facilitate communication with websites using Adobe
Flash or HTML5 local storage.47 These cookies can store a user’s
preference information, retrieve saved data from a supercookieenabled application, or track users’ behavior across time and
websites.48 Supercookies can be automatically recreated after a
user deletes them by storing the information in multiple locations

45

Jose Pagliery, “Super cookies” Track You, Even in Privacy Mode, CNN
TECH (Jan. 9, 2015, 10:03 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/09/
technology/security/super-cookies/.
46
Mayer & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 415.
47
Flash cookies also are called local shared objects (LSOs). Id. at 421.
48
John Naughton, When the Cookies Crumbled, So Did Your Web Anonymity,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2014, 7:05 PM). https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2014/oct/05/cookies-crumbled-internet-anonymity.
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on the user’s computer, which is more invasive than other standard
HTTP cookie technologies.49
Clearly, “an abundance of data, inexpensive processing power,
and increasingly sophisticated analytical techniques drive
innovation in our increasingly networked society.”50 Indiscriminate
data collection from online user behavior can be collected and used
in many ways. As discussed in this section, types of data collection
fall into two categories, first-party tracking and third-party
tracking, with some overlap between the two distinctions. Many
different tracking mechanisms, however, are used by both types of
tracking. Although the use of data collected via tracking is often
aligned with users’ interests, data gathered during online activity
are also used to target sponsored content like online advertisements
as well as unsponsored content like related web pages.
Independent of the type of tracking technology used is a
general lack of transparency and understanding between websites
and users. A Pew Research survey in 2013 asked Americans to
respond “true” or “false” to the following question: “When a
company posts a privacy policy, it ensures that the company keeps
confidential all the information it collects on users.” About 50
percent of survey respondents incorrectly answered, believing the
statement was “true.”51 Beyond the lack of user understanding of
websites’ privacy policies, there is also an increasing lack of
transparency between what users are giving up in exchange for
accessing the information or services hosted by a website,
especially in the realm of consumer privacy regarding health
information. To access information or services for “free,” users
unknowingly give up personal and non-personal information,
which can lead to the creation of detailed user profiles over time.
49

Understanding Other Online Tracking, FED. TRADE COMM’N CONSUMER
INFO.
(June
2016),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0042-onlinetracking#Understanding_Other_Online_Tracking.
50
THE WHITE HOUSE, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A
Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global
Digital Economy, 4 J. PRIVACY CONFIDENTIALITY 95, 99 (2012).
51
Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy Policy
Is, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is/.
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Beyond user identification, it is also important to understand how
websites owners use personal and non-personal information to
further their economic objectives.
II. THE ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS OF UNINHIBITED TRACKING
AND DATA COLLECTION
In 1961, Nobel Laureate George Stigler wrote “[o]ne should
hardly have to tell academicians that information is a valuable
resource: knowledge is power. Any yet it occupies a slum dwelling
in the town of economics. Mostly it is ignored . . . .”52 In the halfcentury since, a burgeoning literature has led to significant
developments in the field of information economics.53 There are
many legitimate reasons for web property owners to gather,
aggregate, and use personally identifiable and non-personally
identifiable information about a site visitor, and the law is wellsettled that such information can be valuable, confidential
information protected by trade secret law.54 Businesses may want
to identify and refine target markets; learn about and predict future
spending and inventory needs; improve and track advertising
effectiveness; offer complimentary discounts personalized to a
consumer;55 offer coupons designed to encouraged consumers to
switch to a competing brand; increase volume of consumers
buying store brands or higher-profit-margin items; track timing of
purchases to assess staffing needs; develop individualized profiles
for more effective introduction of new or complementary products;
design products more likely to be successful; and/or engage in a
host of other business strategies and decisions.56 While many
consumers might not object to their personal and non-personal
information being collected to further business interests or to
enhance their shopping experiences, many consumers would likely
52

See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON.
213 (1961).
53
Joseph Stiglitz, Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective, 95
ECON. J. 21, 23–24 (1985).
54
Brian Yeh, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE
SECRETS: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION 2 (2016).
55
In this section, we interchangeably use the terms “consumers” and “users.”
56
Yeh, supra note 54.
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feel differently if data collection and use had a negative impact on
them economically. Does or should a consumer’s right to
informational privacy vary according to how the data about her is
being used or to the nature of the interaction between all
individuals involved in an interaction? What are the economic
implications of consumer online data gathering for both businesses
and consumers?
Our understanding of how information impacts economic
agents’ behavior and market outcomes is significantly richer today
than forty years ago. We have a better understanding of how 1)
economic agents transmit and receive private information to
mitigate market and non-market uncertainty and 2) asymmetrically
informed economic agents impact market efficiency and
outcomes.57 Information can serve as an efficient coordination
mechanism to match economic agents on two sides of an
exchange, improve market efficiency and reduce transaction
costs.58 The impact of asymmetrically informed economic agents
on market and non-market environments also has been widely
studied.59 Recent technological innovations have given economic
agents on all sides of market interactions greater opportunities to
collect, store, and transmit information and have led to more
indiscriminate data collection.60 This market activity, combined
with health care legislation in the United States, provides an
opportunity to explore the economic value of health information.61

57

Stiglitz, supra note 53, at 29–30.
Muriel Niederle, Alvin Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, Matchingversi
(Forthcoming in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 11).
59
Stiglitz, supra note 53; Antonio Cordella, Transaction Costs and
Information Systems: Does IT Add Up?, 21 J. INF. TECH. 195 (2006).
60
Ben Rosen, EU Court Slams Indiscriminate Data Collection, Opening
Challenge to British Cyber Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 21, 2016),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2016/1221/EU-court-slamsindiscriminate-data-collection-opening-challenge-to-British-cyber-law.
61
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67
Fed. Reg. 53,181, 53,254 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 160
and 164); see also Technical Corrections to the Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,944 (Dec. 29,
2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 160 and 164).
58
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Rapid innovation in internet technology has created a vast
global network of voluntarily interconnected autonomous
computer networks built on the Internet Protocol suite:
Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (“TCP/IP”).62
The Internet continues to fundamentally change the ways that
individuals acquire and transmit information, connect socially and
at work, shop for goods and services, and consume entertainment.63
Our interconnected world has created significant economic
opportunities for information content providers and other
intermediaries that create platforms to connect individuals and
organizations on both sides of market and non-market
interactions.64 An implication of the autonomous characteristics of
the Internet is that it operates without a central governing body.65
Each constituent network, web property owner, and intermediary
platform operator sets its own privacy policies.66 The pace of
advances in internet technology, especially in the area of tracking
technologies like those described in sections I.A and I.B, have

62

The TCP/IP protocol is the standard set of communications protocols that
permit users on different computer networks to transmit and receive
information. The suite specifies how data is packaged, addressed, transmitted,
routed, and received. See Vinton Cerf & Robert Kahn, A Protocol for Packet
Network Intercommunication, 5 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 637 (1974).
63
INTERNET SOCIETY, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: AN OVERVIEW –
UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES AND CHALLENGES OF A MORE CONNECTED WORLD
(Oct. 2015), http://g3ict.org/download/p/fileId_1031/productId_340.
64
Examples of market-based interactions include: 1) videogame platforms
(such as Sony PlayStation, Microsoft X-Box, Nintendo) that act as intermediary
between gamers (platform buyers) and game developers; 2) payment card
operates act as intermediaries between cardholder (buyer of goods and services)
and merchants who accept the intermediaries’ payment platform to settle
transactions; and 3) online auctions sites (such as eBay) that match buyers and
sellers of goods and services. Examples of non-market interactions include: 1)
social media sites (such as Facebook) who connect two or more individuals in
social contexts and 2) dating platforms that match individuals looking for
relationships. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in
Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990, 992 (2003).
65
JOVAN KURBALIJA, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNET GOVERNANCE (5th ed.
2012).
66
Norman Bowie & Karim Jamal, Privacy Rights on the Internet: SelfRegulation or Government Regulation?, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 323, 330 (2006).
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outpaced social norms and legal structures in terms of acceptable
practices, especially in the field of privacy.67
Markets consisting of intermediaries that create and operate
platforms designed to directly connect two (or more) parties in
market and non-market interactions are called two-sided (or multisided) markets.68 The literature on two-sided markets refines the
research examining demand-side scale economies; the notion is
that a good or service’s value to one individual depends on the
number of other users.69 The two-sided market literature examines
how distinct users of an intermediary’s economic platform confer
network effects on one another by facilitating direct interaction
between the distinct users.70 Online advertising, price aggregating,
and comparison sites are examples of two-sided, or multi-sided,
markets.71

67

Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT
TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/lawsand-ethics-cant-keep-pace-with-technology/.
68
Rochet & Tirole, supra note 64, at 990.
69
Demand-side scale economies are also identified as network effects or
network externalities. The classic example of a product exhibiting demand-side
scale economies is the telephone: the value of telephones is a function of the
number of other individuals with a telephone. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133,
133–136 (Spring 1994). Demand-side scale economies can be positive or
negative. Congestion is an example of a negative network externality: the value
of the good or service is less valuable as users’ consumption increase. A positive
feedback loop, or bandwagon effect, is an example of a positive network effect:
the value of a good or service increase as buyers’ consumption increases.
70
The network effects in two-sided markets can be both same-side and crossside effects, and either positive or negative. See Andrei Hagiu, Strategic
Decisions for Multisided Platforms, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Dec. 19, 2013),
https://tribunecontentagency.com/article/strategic-decisions-for-multisidedplatforms/ (explaining that the network effects in two-sided markets can be both
same-side and cross-side effects, and either positive or negative).
71
Rochet & Tirole, supra note 64, at 991–92.
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A. An Introduction to Online Tracking Technologies and
Advertising: How Personal and Non-Personal Information Is
Exchanged for “Free” Health-Related Internet Content
According to comScore’s MediaMetrix®, an American media
and data analytics company, ranking “fifty-six of the top 100
websites based on page views in February 2008 presented
advertising,” suggesting that online advertising is a significant
source of revenue for many web property owners.72 In 2016, many
of the same web property owners remain on comScore
MediaMetrix’s Top 50 Properties and likely continue to derive
significant revenue from advertising.73 In 2008, the only directly
health-related web property on comScore’s Top 100 list was
AthenaHealth.com (ranked 88).74 WebMD75 Health ranked 33rd on
comScore’s Top 50 Properties list in February 2016 with over
twenty-eight million unique visitors from desktop devices.76
Online advertising consists of intermediary operators of
platforms designed to coordinate the matching problem of
delivering advertisers’ messages to many potential consumers.
There is no single mode or form of online advertising.77 Indeed,
online advertising can take the form of email campaigns, search

72

David S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution,
and Privacy, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 37 (2009).
73
comScore Ranks the Top 50 U.S. Digital Media Properties for February 2016,
COMSCORE (March 21, 2016), https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Rankings/
comScore-Ranks-the-Top-50-US-Digital-Media-Properties-for-February-2016
(listing websites and their ranks based on the number of unique viewers).
74
Evans, supra note 72 at 41. iVillage.com: The Women’s Network also
provides some health-related content relevant to primarily women, but also
provides much broader media content of interest to women.
75
WebMD is an online content provider that publishes health news and information
to the public. See generally What We Do for Our Users, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-what-we-do-for-our-users (last
updated April 29, 2014); Advertising Policy, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/aboutwebmd-policies/about-advertising-policy (last updated June 9, 2016); Privacy Policy,
WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-privacy-policy (last
updated Dec. 30, 2016).
76
See comScore, supra note 73 (noting that this number rises to 72.5 million
unique visitors/viewer from both desktop and mobile devices).
77
Evans, supra note 72, at 38.
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engine marketing, social media marketing, or display ads.78 While
advertisers are eager to deliver messages, consumers vary
considerably in their willingness to receive online advertising.79
Thus, effectively targeting online advertisements requires website
owners to attract a large number of potential consumers with a
wide variety of behavioral patterns to best leverage the variety of
advertising delivery techniques.80
Many display-ad online advertising platform models exist.
Website owners that deliver content directly can publish
advertising with their content and act as an intermediary
connecting advertising suppliers—like an advertising agency—to
potential consumers. This is an example of the website owner
using first-party tracking technologies to understand its users’
behavior on its own web pages. In this scenario, website owners
typically source advertisements from an advertising agency’s
servers and display ads alongside the website owner’s content.
This is an example of a two-sided market.81
More complex display-ad models exist and include different
economic agents. For example, display-ad space may be allocated
via auction using an ad exchange, which is a technology platform
that hosts advertising inventory from multiple ad networks and
facilitates real-time bidding between buyers and sellers for display
ads.82 Specifically, when a user visits a web property owner’s
pages, a user’s personal and non-personal information and a
request to fill a blank ad space are then transferred to the
publisher’s ad server.83 The user’s information and ad-space-forsale offer are submitted to supply-side ad servers, and the user’s
78

See id. at 39–40 (analyzing revenues of different online advertising
formats).
79
See id. at 39 (“Nevertheless, certain features of the ‘online advertising
ecosystem’ have become clear. On one side of the business are advertisers that
want to reach consumers. On the other side are consumers who may or may not
be receptive to receiving advertising messages.”).
80
See id.
81
See id. at 38.
82
INTERNET ADVERTISING BUREAU, How an Ad is Served with Real Time
Bidding (RTB) – IAB Digital Simplified, YOUTUBE (June 19, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Glgi9RRuJs.
83
Id.
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information is submitted to a data-management platform where it
is connected to demographic information, such as previous
purchase behavior and other information used by advertisers.84 The
user’s information and ad-space offer are bundled into an offer,
returned to the supply-side platform, and sent to an ad exchange.85
Then the ad exchange submits the offer on demand-side
platforms.86 Bidders on the demand-side platforms—typically
acting on behalf of ad agencies—receive the bundled ad offer
supplied by the web property owner and supply-side server and
decide how much to bid for the ad space.87 According to the
Internet Advertising Bureau, the demand-side platform has about
ten milliseconds to respond to an offer.88 Once the winning bid is
accepted through the ad exchange, both parties are notified of the
transaction, and the ad exchange sends the ad link back through the
supply-side platform to the web property owner’s ad server and
ultimately to the user’s browser.89 In this process, a web property
owner uses personal and non-personal information about the user
accessing its pages; this is an example of third-party tracking
technology.90
To examine the manifestation of online advertising, let us
revisit Pamela’s situation. Her internet search about high
cholesterol might lead her to the popular information content
provider WebMD, depicted in Figure 1.

84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
INTERNET ADVERTISING BUREAU, supra note 82.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
The Murky World of Third Party Web Tracking, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 12,
2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/530741/the-murky-world-of-thirdparty-web-tracking/.
85
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Figure 1: Screenshot of WebMD’s Cholesterol and
Triglycerides Health Center Content Page91
The page contains lots of useful information on high
cholesterol, triglycerides, and other health-related content. Under
the “Cholesterol Health Check” section is a statement of the health
ramifications of high cholesterol and general treatments for
abnormal levels of cholesterol.92 WebMD also provides links to
“Latest Headlines” and “Top Stories” related to cholesterol and
other health-related content under the “Today On WebMD.”93 To
fund this content at no cost to consumers, WebMD sells
advertising space alongside the free content.94 For example, in
Figure 1, the LDL-lowering cholesterol statin Repatha® is
advertised in two locations on the page.95 How WebMD’s pages
source the advertising may have significant implications on healthrelated consumer privacy.
91

Id.
See fig. 1.
93
See id.
94
See id.
95
See id.
92
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One possibility is that WebMD is a first-party advertiser and
sources its own advertising directly from advertisers. Under this
scenario, WebMD directly interfaces with advertisers and avoids
advertising through other intermediaries. While WebMD may
collect personal and non-personal information, the information is
not connected to third-party demographic data nor linked to an
individual user. Instead, the WebMD pages populate advertising
based on the personal and non-personal user information it
collected from the user’s account profile and with first-party
tracking tools as a user views WebMD’s health-related content and
pages.96
Another possibility is that WebMD could source its advertising
through an ad exchange, which is a third-party intermediary that
uses a technology platform to facilitate buying and selling of
online advertising from multiple ad networks.97 Prices for these ads
are determined through an auction using a bidding process.98 When
WebMD offers to sell an ad space, it bundles the ad offer along
with consumer information and submits it to the ad exchange.99
Third-party advertisers can use the user’s personal and nonpersonal information along with third-party tracking technologies
to identify the demographics of the ad recipient (consumer of
content) with high probability and connect this information search
to the ad recipient.
96

WebMD
Privacy
Policy,
WEBMD
(Sept.
16,
2017),
http://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-privacy-policy.
97
The major ad exchanges include: AppNexus, AOL’s Marketplace,
DoubleClick (a subsidiary of Google since 2008), Microsoft’s Ad Exchange,
OpenX, Rubicon Project Exchange, and Smaato. WebMD places no restrictions
on the types of advertising in which it can engage. Advertising Policy, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-advertising-policy. Since
ad exchanges are a form of third-party tracking, this is a possibility, (last visited
Sept. 16, 2017). Third-Party Ad Server, KNOW ONLINE ADVERTISING,
http://www.knowonlineadvertising.com/advertisingdictionary/third-party-adserver/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
98
Ad Exchange Auction Model, DOUBLECLICK, https://support.google.com/
adxbuyer/answer/6077702?hl=en (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
99
See WebMD Privacy Policy, supra note 96 (explaining the technical details
of how a blank ad space gets populated using the ad exchange is described in the
previous paragraphs).
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A review of WebMD’s Privacy Policy reveals that it may
collect “personal and non-personal information.”100 These forms of
information are used in a variety of ways, but include: “statistically
analyze user behavior and activity” and “provide you and other
people with similar demographic characteristics and interests with
more relevant content and advertisements.”101 The policy also
discloses that “[w]e [WebMD] may combine Personal and NonPersonal Information collected by WebMD about you, and may
combine this information with information from external sources.
Third parties may also use Non-Personal Information in order to
display advertising that reflects the interests and preferences of our
community.”102 Individuals who prefer that Personal Information
not be used by WebMD can: 1) “opt out” of registering with the
WebMD community; 2) set browser software to reject Cookies; or
3) “opt out” of Cookies advertisers by visiting the Network
Advertising Initiative gateway opt-out site.103
A review of WebMD Network’s Advertising Policy shows that
it accepts advertising from third parties.104 In addition to providing
more general advertising guidelines around the discretion for
determining types of advertising displayed and categories of
advertisements it will knowingly exclude, WebMD specifies that it
uses “Ads by Google” to source “[a]dvertisements that have been
purchased by companies that want to have links to their websites
appear adjacent to search results in response to specific terms.”105
An important implication is that health-related information
content providers produce and distribute health-related content that
is “freely” available to users.106 To generate revenue, content
100

“Personal information” includes: an individual’s name, address, telephone
number, email address, and health information. Id. “Non-personal information”
includes: cookies, web beacons, WebMD mobile device applications, and data
from external sources. Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
See Advertising Policy, supra note 75.
105
Id.
106
Some content may require the user to provide profile information in a user
account. Thus, “freely” means there is no explicit monetary transaction, but the
user does give up some personal information in exchange for the information
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providers sell advertising and collect personally and nonpersonally identifiable information to improve the advertising
targeting and efficiency.107 While content providers and website
owners often have explicit privacy and advertising policies, most
users are likely unaware of how their personal and non-personal
information is used.108 Opt-out style privacy and advertising
policies contribute to the sense of “freely” available content
without fully understanding that personally identifiable and nonpersonally identifiable information implicitly is exchanged for
health-related content and other goods and services on the
Internet.109
B. Internet Technology and Economic Incentives: Price
Discrimination
A firm with some degree of market power has an incentive to
design price strategies that enhance its profitability. This often
leads a firm to charge different prices for identical or seemingly
identical goods and services in different markets, a practice known
as price discrimination.110 While multiple forms of price
discrimination exist, traditionally the strategies are divided into
three categories: 1) first degree—charging each consumer her
reservation price;111 2) second degree—practice of posting a
schedule of declining prices to consumers with different demand
content. See John Gallaugher, Pat Auger & Anat Barnir, Revenue Streams and
Digital Content Providers: An Empirical Investigation, 38 INFO. & MGMT. 1, 7
(2001) (discussing the exchange of personal information for content in the
context of “freely” available web content).
107
See Evans, supra note 72, at 37–56.
108
See Lee Rainie, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES.
CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/thestate-of-privacy-in-america/ (discussing a Pew Research study finding that 47
percent of “Americans struggle to understand the nature and scope of data
collected about them”).
109
See id.
110
HAL R. VARIAN, Price Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee & Richard D. Willig eds., 1989).
111
A “reservation price” is the upper limit on the price a consumer would pay
for a good or service. See Ian Steedman, Reservation Price and Reservation
Demand, 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 5537–38
(1987).
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but cannot associate buyers and their demand to permit buyers to
self-select what to purchase; a classic example is a providing a
menu of prices for different quantities or qualities; and 3) third
degree—charging different prices to different consumer groups.112
Each form of price discrimination varies in terms of profitability
and information needed to implement the strategies.
Price discrimination is not a new practice and has been
successfully and unsuccessfully implemented in both online and
traditional markets. Airlines successfully engage in second-degree
price discrimination in traditional markets by charging different
prices for first-class and coach seats and by charging different
prices for the same seat according to how far in advance a ticket is
booked from its departure date.113 In 1999, the Coca-Cola
Company tested a variable-price Coke machine. Essentially, the
Coca-Cola Company designed a vending machine that can adjust
prices based on demand in current market conditions; for example,
price adjustment could be positively correlated with the outside
temperature or negatively correlated with the time of day and foot
traffic.114 Despite resting on sound economic principles, Coke’s
variable-price vending machine was met with public disdain as
angry Coke drinkers voiced their opinions in Internet chat rooms
and newspaper editorials around the world, which led Coke to
abandon widespread adoption of the “innovation.”115
As tracking technologies become increasingly sophisticated,
online retailers increasingly are exploring and using different
forms of price discrimination. Amazon, for example, uses first- and
third-party tracking technologies to engage in price
112

See MICHAEL R. BAYE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS
STRATEGY 404–410 (5th ed. 2017).
113
See Tejvan Pettinger, Airline Price Discrimination, ECON. HELP BLOG
(Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/7767/business/airline-pricediscrimination/.
114
Constance L. Hays, Variable-Price Coke Machine Being Tested, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 28, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/28/business/variableprice-coke-machine-being-tested.html.
115
David Leonhardt, Why Variable Pricing Fails at the Vending Machine,
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 27, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/27/business/whyvariable-pricing-fails-at-the-vending-machine.html?_r=0.
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discrimination.116 When a consumer makes a purchase from
Amazon or one of its affiliates, Amazon collects a name, address,
email, phone number, credit card number, IP address, browser
type, operating system, purchase history and other information and
uses it in a variety of ways.
On the upside, Amazon has designed a platform that enables
personalized shopping experiences for its customers by giving
them the ability to create “wish lists,” access other customer
reviews for products, and recommend products through the
“Recommended for You” feature, among other features.117
Amazon’s data-rich consumer database is the basis for Amazon’s
Advertising Platform, which connects advertisers to Amazon
shoppers on Amazon’s web properties as well as across the
Internet and on mobile apps.118 These are examples of seconddegree price discrimination and, in general, appear to be designed
to provide Amazon customers with a more personal experience.119
Data collected using first-party tracking technologies, namely
transactions and cookies, are the primary driver behind these
personalized shopping experiences.
However, despite these upsides to consumers increasingly
sophisticated tracking technologies facilitate the use of something
closer to first-degree price discrimination, or dynamic pricing,
based on personal and non-personal information. In September
2000, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos admitted the company charged
significantly different prices for the same DVDs in a “randomized
price test.”120 More recently, lawsuits filed against Amazon alleged
116

See Jakub Mikians et al., Detecting Price and Search Discrimination on the
Internet, HOTNETS-XI PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH ACM WORKSHOPS ON HOT
TOPICS IN NETWORKS, 80–82 (2012), https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2390245.
117
Amazon Privacy Notice, A MAZON . COM , https://www.amazon.com/
gp/help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496#examples (last
visited Sept. 17, 2017).
118
See id.
119
See Mikians et al., supra note 116, at 80–82.
120
Anita Ramasastry, Web Sites Change Prices Based on Customers’ Habits,
CNN INT’L (June 24, 2005), http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/24/
ramasastry.website.prices/. At least one customer reported that Amazon offered
a significantly lower DVD price after he deleted cookies identifying himself as a
“regular” Amazon customer. Id. Bezos’ admission of the “randomized pricing
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that Amazon Prime’s “free” shipping is not free since Amazon
Prime members are charged high base prices to cover shipping
costs.121
Notwithstanding pending litigation, there is nothing inherently
illegal about Amazon’s price discrimination efforts; firms in other
markets have similar practices.122 Most markets currently do not
have restrictions on what personal and non-personal information
can be collected and shared. An exception is how personal and
non-personal health-related information is collected, stored, and
shared as described in HIPAA. As explained more fully in Part IV,
this raises the question whether the spirit, if not the letter of
HIPAA, may be violated in markets using a two-sided platform,
like a third-party ad exchange platform or other platforms using
third-party tracking technologies.
Incentives for firms to engage in price discrimination may lead
to health-related data collection, storage, aggregation, and sharing
practices. For example, suppose our hypothetical patient, Pamela,
decides in consultation with her doctor to treat her condition with a
combination of diet, exercise, and medication. While browsing
WebMD, Pamela saw an advertisement for Repatha, a drug that
treats high cholesterol by lowering LDL. She mentions Repatha to
her doctor, and they agree on the appropriate treatment for her
specific case. To explore the cost of her proposed Repatha
test – ‘mistake’” included: 1) a statement that Amazon would offer to refund the
6,896 high-paying customers the difference between the price paid and the
lowest price during the period, an amount totaling about $21,377.60, see id., and
2) that Amazon did not and never will use consumer demographic data as a basis
for test prices, Michael J. Martinez, Amazon Error May End Dynamic Pricing,
ABC NEWS (Sept.
29,
2016),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/
story?id=119399&page=1. Note, personal and non-personal information are
different from consumer demographic data. See id.
121
See Jennifer Abel, Lawsuit Alleges Amazon Charges Prime Members for “Free”
Shipping, CONSUMER AFF. (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/
news/lawsuit-alleges-amazon-charges-prime-members-for-free-shipping-031414.html;
Tricia Duryee, Lawsuit Alleges Amazon Prime Third-Party Prices Are Inflated to
Cover Shipping, GEEK WIRE (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.geekwire.com/2014/lawsuitalleges-amazon-prime-third-party-prices-inflated-cover-shipping/.
122
See John Spacey, 10 Examples of Price Discrimination, SIMPLICABLE (Jan.
12, 2016), http://simplicable.com/new/price-discrimination.
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treatment, Pamela visits www.GoodRx.com, which is a price
comparison intermediary (price aggregator) that lists prices of
different pharmaceutical retailers on its platform. As an
intermediary, GoodRx provides price information on various firms
for a broad variety of pharmaceutical products thereby facilitating
transactions between potential consumers (in consultations with
their doctors) and retail pharmaceutical sellers through the use of
coupons on its platform.123 Pharmaceutical consumers can use
GoodRx for “free” to access drug price information and coupons.124
GoodRx generates revenue by charging referral fees and selling
advertising.125
A search for Repatha on www.GoodRx.com results in the
webpage shown in Figure 2.

123

How GoodRx Works, GOODRX, https://www.goodrx.com/how-goodrxworks (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). According to GoodRx’s Privacy Policy, the
company does not collect any personal information from users unless a visitor
“register[s] to receive certain services,” such as price alerts, coupons and
discount cards. Privacy Policy, GOODRX, https://www.goodrx.com/privacypolicy (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). There are options that require a user to
provide an email address, phone number, and/or name and mailing address. Id.
GoodRx also uses cookie technology “[t]o collect, store and sometimes track
information for statistical purposes to improve the service we provide.” Id.
Additional information collected with cookies includes: 1) locational
information, 2) drug information accessed while visiting www.goodrx.com, and
3) third-party websites a user visited before accessing www.goodrx.com. Id.
User information collected via cookies is retained for 30 days and is associated
with the user’s account information, if an account exists. Id. While GoodRx’s
cookies do not enable third parties to access personally identifiable information,
visiting other websites may require the user to accept a third-party cookie. Id.
GoodRx claims they do not control the use of any third-party cookies deposited
from other websites, and “expressly disclaim[s] responsibility for information
collected through them [third-party websites].” Id.
124
How GoodRx Works, GOODRX, https://www.goodrx.com/how-goodrxworks (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
125
Id. There is no description that reveals whether GoodRx engages in firstparty or third-party advertising practices.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of GoodRx’s Webpage for Retailers’
Prices and Coupons for the Cholesterol-Lowering Drug, Repatha
There are options for our 40-year-old woman to set her location
by zip code and sign in to the GoodRx website. Doing either of
these could permit the companies to charge different prices by zip
code or based on other personally or non-personally identifiable
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information.126 A user entering neither piece of information results
in a price range between $1,148.66 and $1,207.69 before discounts
for two syringes (1 ml) of Repatha 140mg/ml. An open question is
whether GoodRx permits pharmaceutical retailers to engage in any
form of first-degree, price discrimination based on information
collected from consumers on its website. That is, whether each
consumer sees a different set of prices based on their personal and
consumer information. GoodRx’s current privacy policy suggests
that information is not shared unless to facilitate a requested
transaction.127 However, the technology exists to engage in this
behavior, and absent legislation that delineates boundaries on the
management of this health-related information, consumers are left
to rely on individual website’s privacy policies, which can, and
often do, evolve.
To reinforce the speculation that GoodRx has the technical
capability to engage in price discrimination, consider the
following. A 2016 NPR interview revealed how machine-based
algorithms used by the Princeton Review resulted in significantly
different online SAT course prices across the nation: prices
ranging from $6,600 to $8,400.128 Asians were almost twice as
likely as non-Asians to be charged higher prices for the Princeton
Review’s online SAT preparation course.129 Although it was
unclear whether Asians were charged higher prices because they
were Asian or because they lived in certain zip codes that are

126

Prices and Coupons for 2 Syringes (1ml) of Repatha 140mg/ml, GOODRX,
https://www.goodrx.com/repatha?drug-name=repatha (last visited Sept. 17,
2017). Currently, a review of four or five different zip codes does not suggest
that individual retailers listing prices on GoodRx charge different prices;
however, different retailers are available in different zip codes so the price range
varies.
127
See Privacy Policy, supra note 124.
128
ProPublica Reveals Discriminatory Pricing by Computer Algorithms, NPR
(Oct. 19, 2016, 4:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/19/498582157/
propublica-reveals-discriminatory-pricing-by-computer-algorithms.
129
See id.
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predominantly Asian, the Princeton Review indicated that the
discrimination against Asians was not intentional.130
Independent of current industry practices, Parts I and II suggest
that it is technologically feasible to indiscriminately collect
personal and non-personal information. Furthermore, strong
economic motivations exist to collect, store, aggregate, and
transfer personal and non-personal information that can be linked
back to other demographic information. The result: indiscriminate
data collection can lead to health-related information being used to
identify individuals. Moral and ethical issues aside, this type of
indiscriminate data collection raises significant privacy concerns—
especially in the realm of health-related information. In Part III, we
explore whether there are legal protections available to protect
unsuspecting users from this data collection, storage, aggregation,
and sharing.
III. LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
Data aggregation of information obtained from a computer
user’s search history (as opposed to volunteering information or
transactional data) arguably catches the consumer unaware. Would
the consumer in the opening scenario be surprised to learn how her
search for cardiac information was being used, or even that it was
being used at all? While such information is valuable to businesses
for ad-revenue generation, better ad targeting, or price
discrimination as explained above, how far does and should the
protection of business’ economic interests go vis-a-vis consumers?
The United States has taken a rather ad hoc approach to data
privacy. Those federal statutes that do exist target specific
industries such as healthcare, communications, education, financial
services, and online data collection regarding minors.131 Aside from
some enforcement actions by the FTC and a smattering of state
laws, industry best practices shaped and enforced by company

130

Id. It should be noted that although the Princeton Review seemed to draw
lines for their zip code pricing in a way that encompassed primarily high-income
areas, also included in this group were many low-income Asians areas. Id.
131
THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 50, at 6.
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privacy officers and other privacy professionals are the primary
influence of standards of privacy protection.132
A. The Historical Roots of Privacy Protection
The ancient, classical Greek133 notion of privacy as a state of
deprivation was turned on its head beginning during the Middle
Ages134 and gained momentum with the explosion of individual
rights ideas developed by John Locke and others.135 Political
philosophers invoked the concept of private, as opposed to public,
spheres of life “as a way to limit state power and to legitimate the
concept of private property.”136 Such a public/private sphere
differentiation had obvious and profound influences on the framers
of the U.S. Constitution, evident in the wording of the Fourth
Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated but upon probable cause . . . .”137 The
text of the Fourth Amendment embodies the two stated privacy
concerns Constitutional framers had: (1) that Fourth Amendment
privacy addresses rights of the private citizen against government
intrusion; and (2) that Fourth Amendment privacy deals with
limitations on physical or spatial intrusion by the government.
While these remain an underpinning for modern-day privacy
132

Id.
Ironically, privacy in ancient civilizations was based on a “sense of
impoverishment and exclusion,” according to noted architectural historian
Joseph Rykwert in his article Privacy in Antiquity, 68 SOC. RES. 29, 31 (2001).
The Ancient Greeks thought that “service to the polis or city-state, was the
highest calling.” Winch, supra note 15, at 200. In fact, the word for privacy in
Ancient Greek, idion (not coincidentally the root for idiot) “referred to that
which separates one out from the unity of the community, the humanity of the
polis.” Id. at 201. Hannah Arendt noted: “the privative trait of privacy, indicated
in the word itself, was all-important: it meant literally a state of being deprived
of something . . . [a] man who lived only a private life who – like the slave –
was not permitted to enter the public realm or . . . was not fully human.”
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 38 (2nd ed. 1958).
134
Winch, supra note 15, at 200.
135
David Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The Warrant
Requirement, 96 B.U.L. REV. 425, 450 (2016).
136
Id.
137
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
133
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rights, both notions of privacy and the corresponding privacy law
have evolved considerably.
During the founding of the United States, privacy concerns
centered on the individual’s right to prevent intrusion by the
government, not by other private individuals or businesses.
Philosophical writings of the time evince this vein of thinking,
revealing the natural reaction to an emergence from British
imperial rule as well as with the general and long-standing
historical division between “public” and “private” life. This was
the backdrop for the Fourth Amendment’s protection of individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures and its progeny
recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy.138 In the landmark
case Katz v. United States,139 Justice Harlan stated in his concurring
opinion that the Constitution protects people (not places) against
unreasonable searches and seizures by a reasonable expectation of
privacy, which involves two requirements: “first that a person ha[s]
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”140 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment’s “origin and
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental agencies.”141
138

For a thoughtful article evaluating and criticizing the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” standard, see generally Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable
Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843 (2002).
Among the flaws Professor Spencer points out are: reasonable expectations of
privacy involve constantly-shifting expectations; it is subject to disproportionate
influence by major businesses and powers; reasonable people could disagree as
to their expectations of privacy; such disagreement could vary regionally,
creating particular problems for the United States Supreme Court; and increased
technological advancement can lead to a corresponding decrease in privacy. Id.
139
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
140
Id. at 361.
141
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). Other cases have held
that a private parties’ wrongful search and seizure does not violate the Fourth
Amendment and, therefore, does not deprive the government of using that
evidence lawfully received by the private party. See, e.g., United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125–26 (1984); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1223,
1225 (Utah 1988) (finding that the informant was not acting as a government
agent when he searched the defendant’s premises, the Supreme Court of Utah
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The extensive line of Fourth Amendment cases deciding what
constitutes unreasonable search and seizure is of limited
applicability here. While it is tempting to utilize definitions of (and
glean examples of) reasonable expectations of privacy from these
cases, potential privacy intrusions by the government are not
analogous to potential privacy intrusions by business. The history
behind and rationale for limiting governmental intrusion (and the
accompanying harms to individuals and society) do not parallel the
history, rationale, ethical considerations, or type of injury
experienced by consumers when businesses profile their healthrelated data in detail based on online searches and the like. Statutes
and cases decided in the context of consumer information provide
far more relevant guidance.142
The historical development of the right to be free from certain
types of non-governmental intrusion stems largely from the
thoughtful and influential work The Right to Privacy.143 Giving the
modern reader an eerie sense of déjà vu, Warren and Brandeis
reveal that their motivation and determination in writing an article
to advance privacy theory was: technological advancement.
Writing in 1890, they asserted that one justification for expanding
certain privacy rights beyond situations where courts could identify
breach of contract or breach of confidence/trust type theories was
“now that modern devices afford abundant opportunities for the
upheld defendant’s conviction). In Jacobsen, Federal Express personnel
discovered a package that had been accidentally torn open by a forklift. 466 U.S.
at 111. Upon examining the contents, consistent with written company policy
and necessary for insurance purposes, they became suspicious and contacted the
Drug Enforcement Administration. Id. The contents, it turns out, were cocaine.
Id. The United States Supreme Court held that “federal agents did not infringe
any constitutionally protected privacy interest that had not already been
frustrated as the result of private conduct.” Id. at 126. In Watts, an unidentified
informant met a police officer near the defendant’s home and pointed out to the
officer a shed located on the defendant’s property and voiced suspicions as to
the shed’s use for the cultivation of marijuana. 750 P.2d at 1220. Upon returning
to the premises with a warrant and finding no one home, police searched the
shed and seized material which ultimately proved to be marijuana. Id.
142
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 919 (2005).
143
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
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perpetration of . . . wrongs without any participation by the injured
party, the protection granted by the law must be placed upon a
broader foundation.”144
Much of this oft-cited article focuses on issues relating to the
public revelation of facts or ideas which a person would expect to
be confidential. In a general sense, Warren and Brandeis detailed
the exact discomfort that many privacy advocates have complained
of:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and
man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive
to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to
the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through
invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress,
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.145

Since Warren and Brandeis’ seminal article, rights to privacy
protection against non-governmental individuals and entities have
developed tremendously, at both federal and state levels.146
B. Federal Standards
At the federal level, some limited privacy protections are
provided by statutory law and by the administrative efforts of the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). The FTC is an independent
federal agency with the twofold mission of (1) consumer
protection and (2) enhancing industry competition.147 As part of its
responsibilities, the FTC addresses a variety of practices that
impact consumers, including those behaviors that may violate a
consumer’s lawfully protected privacy rights.148 The FTC’s goals
in privacy work are “to protect consumers’ personal information
and ensure that consumers have the confidence to take advantage
of the many benefits offered in the marketplace.”149
144

Id. at 211.
Id. at 196.
146
Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and
Brandeis, 39 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 703 (1990).
147
FED. TRADE COMM’N, Privacy & Data Security Update, 1 (2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2015.
148
Id.
149
Id.
145
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1.

Federal Statutes
Congressional curtailment of businesses’ use of consumer
information has been driven largely by consideration of: (1) who is
using the information and (2) what the information is about—
financial, medical, videotape, etc. Major federal legislation relating
to businesses’ use of consumer information has been piecemeal,
often targeting restrictions for one specific sector or industry such
as those described below.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”)150 applies to
consumer reporting agencies, permitting them to release a
consumer report only to a court, to the consumer him/herself, or to
a person the consumer reporting agency has reason to believe
intends to use the information for specifically enumerated purposes
(such as evaluating the consumer’s creditworthiness for extending
credit).151 A consumer reporting agency’s release of target
marketing information to vendors violates the FCRA because such
information is not necessary for lenders in their pre-screening
process.152
The Gramm Leach Bliley Act (“GBLA”) of 1999153 mandates
that financial institutions take appropriate safeguards “to insure the
security and confidentiality of customer records and
information.”154 For these purposes, “financial institutions” include
but are not limited to: banks, savings associations, and insurance
providers, as well as brokers, dealers, investment companies, and

150

15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2016).
Other purposes include the review or collection of an account of the
consumer’s; employment purposes; underwriting insurance; eligibility for a
license or other government-issued benefit for which investigation of the
applicant’s financial responsibility is legally mandated; review by current or
potential investors valuing credit risks and obligations; a legitimate business
need for the information in connection with a business transaction initiated by
the consumer; or a legitimate business need to review whether a consumer
continues to meet the terms of an existing account. Id. § 1681(b).
152
In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 326 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
153
15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2016).
154
Id. § 6801(b)(1).
151
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investment advisers under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).155
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”)156 and its accompanying regulations promulgated by
the Department of Health and Human Services157 require that
health care providers, administrators and employees of health care
plans, healthcare clearinghouses and health insurance companies
protect the privacy of individually identifiable health
information.158 HIPAA will be revisited and explored more fully in
Part IV.
2.

Regulatory Efforts
Since the 1990s, the FTC has been seeking ways to address
privacy concerns regarding the data gleaned from individuals’
Internet activities.159 In its 2009 report, “Self-Regulatory Principles
for Online Behavioral Advertising,” the FTC advocated selfregulation of the industry.160 In response, leaders in the advertising
155

Id. § 6805(a).
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191,
110 Stat. 1998 (1996).
157
D’Lisa Simmons, Impact of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, HOUSTON LAWYER
(May/June 2006), http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa_may06/page20.htm. See
generally 45 C.F.R. § 160.408 (2016).
158
Interestingly, as argued in The HIPAA Privacy Regulation – Troubled
Process, Troubling Results, a Special Report issued by Privacilla.org in April
2003, Congress “punted” on the issue of privacy protection under HIPAA:
Congress . . . wondered aloud what privacy was and how it should be
protected . . . [and] asked the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to make recommendations to Congress about the privacy of
individually identifiable health information [and then] told the
Secretary of HHS to go ahead and write into law whatever the
recommendations were if Congress did not act.
The HIPAA Privacy Regulation – Trouble Process, Troubling Results, Privacilla.org
(Apr. 2003), http://www.privacilla.org/releases/HIPAA_Report.html.
159
Courtney A. Barclay, A Comparison of Proposed Legislative Data Privacy
Protections in the United States, 29 COMPUTER L. AND SEC. REV. 359, 360
(2013).
160
FED. TRADE COMM’N, Staff Report: Self-Regulatory Principles for Online
Behavioral Advertising, Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and
Technology
(2009),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
156
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industry proposed guidelines aimed at improving transparency and
making consumers aware of privacy policies and opt-out tools.161
Although industry leaders came together to discuss more
transparent processes to protect consumers’ privacy, progress was
slow. The FTC expressed displeasure with the industry’s slow pace
toward reform and instead proposed in 2010 that a simple do-nottrack mechanism be offered to consumers to allow consumers to
easily opt out of data protection.162 Earlier that year, the Wall Street
Journal released an investigative series of articles, “What They
Know,” which examined the quickly-growing business of spying
on consumers.163 This series revealed that, on average, more than
60 pieces of tracking technology are installed on a user’s computer
by the most frequently used 50 websites.164 This brought concerns
of data privacy to national attention. Testifying before Congress in
2010, then-director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection
David Vladeck told House members that “the Commission
supports a more uniform and comprehensive consumer choice
mechanism for online behavioral advertising.”165 Such an approach
would essentially place a persistent cookie on a browser which
would then alert websites visited whether the consumer consents to
being tracked.166 Although the FTC called on the industry,
specifically the World Wide Web Consortium, to help design how
Do Not Track would work, a final workable solution was never

federal-trade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioraladvertising/p085400behavadreport.pdf.
161
Barclay, supra note 159, at 360.
162
FED. TRADE COMM’N, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid
Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers, 66 (2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-tradecommission-bureau-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-reportprotecting-consumer/101201privacyreport.pdf.
163
Barclay, supra note 159, at 359.
164
Id. at 359–60.
165
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Testifies on Do Not Track Legislation (Dec. 2,
2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/12/ftc-testifies-donot-track-legislation.
166
Id.
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achieved “despite years of meetings and thousands of emails.”167
Significantly, prominent members of the consortium group walked
away from the Do Not Track efforts, citing frustration at the
process.168 For example, the Digital Advertising Alliance, a
consortium of some of the biggest ad-technology companies,
withdrew from the group in September 2013 complaining that the
group was not capable of developing a workable solution.169
Consumer Watchdog, a California-based advocacy group, also
withdrew from the Digital Advertising Alliance in 2014, concerned
that even if standards were developed, they would only be
voluntary and would offer no incentive for online companies to
comply with a consumer’s Do Not Track request.170 Although the
group ultimately released a proposed set of rules in August 2015,
this proposal was met with criticism from members of Congress
and from third-party ad tech companies because the proposed rules
created a double standard that permitted Internet publishers with
direct consumer relationships, such as Google or Facebook, to
track customer information, but imposed stricter privacy rules on
third-party independent ad companies.171 To date, none of the
various pieces of Do Not Track legislation that were introduced in
Congress have succeeded in becoming law.172
Even if industry standards were adopted, such action would not
ensure industry compliance. Consider, for example, Google’s
actions in Canada. Canada’s Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”), enacted in 2000,
mandates that targeted advertising cannot be generated through the

167

Dawn Chmielewski, How ‘Do Not Track’ Ended Up Going Nowhere,
RECODE.NET (Jan. 4, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.recode.net/2016/1/4/
11588418/how-do-not-track-ended-up-going-nowhere.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Do Not Track Online Act of 2015, S. 2404, 114th Cong. (2015) (sponsored
by Senator Richard Blumenthal, D–CT); Do Not Track Online Act of 2013, S.
418, 113th Cong. (2013) (sponsored by Senator John D. Rockefeller, D–WV);
Do Not Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011) (sponsored by
Senator John D. Rockefeller, D–WV).
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use of sensitive personal data.173 Specifically, Canadian law
Principle 4.3 states that “the knowledge and consent of the
individual are required for the collection, use, or disclosure of
personal information, except where inappropriate.”174 Principle
4.3.6 states that “[a]n organization should generally seek express
consent when the information is likely to be considered
sensitive.”175 Sensitive personal data includes information about a
person’s health.176 For information that is less sensitive, implied
consent would generally be adequate.177 In 2012, the Canadian
Privacy Commissioner issued behavioral guidelines, stating that
“[i]t is inappropriate for sensitive health information to be used in
behavioral advertising.”178 On this point, Privacy Commissioner
Chantal Bernier stated: “As Canadians spend more and more time
online, they create a digital trail [clickstream data] that can reveal a
great deal about a person. Organizations such as Google must
ensure privacy rights are respected in this complex
environment.”179
Operating within Canada, Google’s privacy policy explicitly
stated that the company would not associate cookies with
information about an individual’s health, sexual orientation,
religion, or race.180 Despite this assurance, the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada found that Google violated Canada’s
173

Susan Krashinsky Robertson, Google Broke Canada’s Privacy Laws with
Targeted Health Ads, watchdog says, GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 15, 2014, 12:37 PM),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/tech-news/google-broke-canadasprivacy-laws-with-targeted-ads-regulator-says/article16343346/.
174
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000,
c. 5 P. 7 (Can.).
175
Id. at 48.
176
Id.; see also PIPEDA Report of Findings #2014-001 (Jan. 14, 2014),
https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/
investigations-into-businesses/2014/pipeda-2014-001/.
177
Id.
178
NIRICO SYSTEMS, INC., Google Breaks Privacy Laws in Canada By Using
Sensitive Health Information, https://www.nirico.com/google-breaks-privacylaws-in-canada-by-using-sensitive-health-information/ (last visited Sept. 17,
2017).
179
Id.
180
Id.
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privacy laws through its use of targeted online advertising.181 The
Office of the Privacy Commissioner began its investigation into
Google’s activities in response to a consumer complaint. A
consumer who had searched for devices for sleep apnea noticed
that even when he was on other sites, ads were popping up from
Google’s AdSense promoting similar devices.182 If Google acted
contrary to Canadian privacy laws and contrary to its own stated
privacy policy, how much more skeptical should we be of a search
engine’s ability to respect privacy rights when the primary
motivator is merely self-regulation?
In 2012, President Obama introduced the Consumer Privacy
Bill of Rights “as a blueprint for privacy in the information age.”183
The purpose of this action was to offer consumers guidance on the
expectations that companies and individuals handling consumers’
personal information should meet.184 He urged Congress to pass
legislation codifying the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights that
would allow both the FTC and state attorneys general to enforce
the rule’s mandates.185 The proposal also recommended a safe
harbor provision that would allow companies to utilize their own
company code of conduct as a means of compliance with the
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, as long as such code was
approved by the FTC.186 Congress never enacted the Consumer
Privacy Bill of Rights, and now with the change in administration,
the bill has been moved off the Whitehouse.gov website and into
the White House archives. These efforts were, however, a step in
the right direction and will be revisited in Part V.
In October 2016, the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) issued new rules that limited Internet service providers’
181

Robertson, supra note 173; see ruling at PIPEDA Report of Findings
#2014-001 (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-anddecisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2014/pipeda-2014-001/.
182
Id.
183
THE WHITE HOUSE, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A
Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global
Digital Economy (Feb. 23, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
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(“ISPs”) use of customer data.187 The executive director of the
Center for Digital Democracy called the rule adoption “the best
day we’ve had on Internet privacy—commercial Internet
privacy—maybe ever.”188 Under the new requirements, Internet
providers had to obtain a user’s consent before using information
or sharing information with third parties.189 The rules were
designed to apply to Internet providers but not to other companies
such as Google and Facebook.190 As a result, critics of the new
regulations complained that “[t]here is no lawful, factual, or sound
policy basis to justify a discriminatory approach that treats ISPs
differently from some of the largest companies in the Internet
ecosystem that engage in similar practices.”191 In fact, in the first
half of 2016, Facebook and Google combined accounted for 70%
of online advertising, and together they were responsible for nearly
all the 2016 growth in online advertising.192 However, before the
FTC’s new rules could go into effect, they were repealed by
Congress in March 2017.193
C. State Efforts
The federal government’s piecemeal approach to consumer
privacy and failure to provide comprehensive reform has led some
to look to the states for online privacy protection. Some states have
looked no further than their state constitution for consumer privacy
protection. In some cases, state statutes or state common law help
187

Brian Fung & Craig Timberg, The FCC Just Passed Sweeping New Rules
to Protect Your Online Privacy, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/10/27/the-fcc-justpassed-sweeping-new-rules-to-protect-your-onlineprivacy/?utm_term=.7177ddc176dd.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Hal Singer, We Should Welcome Trump’s Reversal of FCC Digital Privacy
Rules, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/
2017/02/02/how-many-regulators-does-it-take-to-protect-our-digitalprivacy/#43d88de86d21.
193
David Shepardson, Trump Signs Repeal of U.S. Broadband Privacy Rules,
REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-internet-trumpidUSKBN1752PR.
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protect consumer privacy. We examine the relevant state landscape
in this section.
1.

State Constitutions
Beyond the Fourth Amendment federal constitutional
protection of privacy from government intrusion, some states
specifically provide a measure of privacy against private, nongovernment entities. California,194 Hawaii,195 and Illinois196
guarantee privacy rights specifically in the text of their
constitutions. Some other states’ constitutions grant a right to
privacy that applies only to state actions, such as Alaska,197
Arizona,198 Florida,199 Louisiana,200 and South Carolina.201 Yet other
194

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”).
195
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized
and shall not be infringed without a showing of a compelling state interest . . .
“); Op. Att’y Gen. No. 94–01 (1994) (revealing that one of the purposes
intended by the Hawaiian legislature was to guard against “possible abuses in
the use of highly personal and intimate information in the hands of the
government or private parties.”) (emphasis added).
196
In In re Minor, the Supreme Court of Illinois noted that “[i]t is clear from
the debates in the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention that . . . . [Illinois’
constitutional right to privacy] was intended to protect an individual’s privacy
from invasions or injuries caused by another nongovernmental individual or
company.” In re Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (Ill. 1992).
197
See Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 102 P.3d 282 (Alaska 2004) (holding that a
grocery store clerk’s right to privacy under the Alaska constitution had not been
infringed because there was no state action).
198
See Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 460 P.2d 666, 669 (Ariz. 1969)
(denying that the Arizona constitutional right to privacy gives rise to a private
cause of action between private individuals); see also ARIZ. CONST ART. II, § 8
(right to privacy).
199
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every natural person has the right to be let alone
and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life . . .”).
200
LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person shall be secure in his person,
property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.”).
201
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and

46

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 19: 1

states’ constitutions extend the right to privacy only to voter
registration-related issues.202
Several California cases help illustrate the circumstances under
which successful consumer privacy actions brought under state
constitutional provisions against non-government parties. In
Pioneer Electronics v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,203
the plaintiff bought an allegedly defective DVD player from
Pioneer Electronics.204 In seeking to bring suit on his own behalf
and on behalf of others similarly situated, he asked through
discovery request for identifying information about others who had
complained about this particular DVD model.205 Pioneer responded
that it could not disclose the names because to do so would violate
the California state constitutional right to privacy.206 Ultimately,
the California Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s order requiring Pioneer to convey information on the
customers who had purchased its DVD players and held that
requiring the customers to opt-out would be sufficient.207 In its
rationale, the court relied on a three-part test: (1) would the
customers have expected their information to be confidential
unless they affirmatively opted out; (2) was there serious invasion
of privacy in releasing the information; and (3) the interests of the
plaintiff in wanting to learn the data is weighed against the
possibility of customers failing to receive the opt-out notice and
objecting to the data’s release.208 In brief, the California state
constitutional privacy provision only protects an individual’s
expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.209
In 2011, the California Court of Appeals re-visited the topic of
consumer privacy rights under the California Constitution. In Los
particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or thing to be seized,
and the information to be obtained”).
202
See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. LI, § 6; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
203
150 P.3d 198 (Cal. 2007).
204
Id. at 199.
205
Id. at 200.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 205–06.
209
Id. at 207.
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Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center v. Superior Court,210 the court
made a critical distinction between general consumer information
(as in the DVD player customers) and health-related consumer
data.211 In that case, a health center servicing gay, lesbian and
transgender people in Los Angeles accidentally administered
bicillin C-R instead of bicillin L-A medication to about 663
patients who were suspected to have syphilis.212 Some patients who
had been treated with the wrong medication brought suit against
the Center and during discovery requested a list of all the other
patients who had been similarly treated with the wrong
medication.213
Relying on the California Constitution’s right to privacy, the
California Appeals Court held that, in contrast to the Pioneer case,
such a list could not be released.214 Applying the test articulated in
Pioneer, the court distinguished between health information and
general consumer information215 and stated:
The class members’ medical records are private . . . . [P]laintiffs have a
reasonable expectation in the privacy of their medical information at
the Center given the extremely sensitive nature of the information
contained in them (sexually transmitted disease, possible HIV status,
and sexual orientation) . . . [and] the proposed invasion here, namely,
disclosure to a wide array of third persons in connection with the
litigation, is serious in nature, scope and potential impact. Thus, we
must balance the competing interests at stake here—the benefits of
efficient litigation where disclosure does not require the class members’
consent and class-wide recovery against the Center versus the class
members’ interest in controlling how this sensitive information is
disseminated.216

In addition to the protection afforded under some states’
constitutions, some states have enacted statutes affording privacy
rights against non-governmental entities. For example,
Massachusetts General Law provides that “[a] person shall have a
right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with
210

125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 169 (2011).
Id. at 184.
212
Id. at 172.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 186.
215
Id. at 184.
216
Id.
211
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his privacy.”217 In a class action suit, the plaintiffs’ allegation in
Weld v. CVS218 that CVS drug store had violated the Massachusetts
privacy statute through the use of sharing consumers’ drug
prescription data survived summary judgment.219 The Weld case
dealt with the legality of a direct mailing program established by
CVS.220 CVS sent targeted customers mailings which reminded
them to fill prescriptions, informed them of new drugs that might
be of interest to them, and encouraged them to discuss potential
medical conditions with their doctors.221 The letters stated the name
of the drug manufacturer that funded that mailing.222 CVS
transferred all prescription information to a third party, Elensys, to
handle the mailing logistics and Elensys in turn contracted with a
company to physically send out the mailings.223 The CVS/Elensys
agreement contained strict confidentiality provisions.224
Almost immediately after the press began reporting on the
program in February 1998, CVS terminated the program,
presumably in response to significant negative publicity.225 But
CVS’s Motion for Summary Judgment, decided in June 1999,
survived on the count alleging violation of Massachusetts’s privacy
law.226 In its decision, the court noted the plaintiffs’ complaint
about not just the use of the information CVS had about the
plaintiffs, but also the systematic searching of the plaintiffs’
prescription records.227 Such a situation could constitute a violation

217

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (2016).
No. 98-0897F, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 261, at 1 (Mass. June 1, 1999).
219
Id.
220
Id. at 2.
221
Id. at 3.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 5.
224
Id. at 6.
225
Rudolph A. Pyatt, Ultimately, A Healthy Decision at Giant and CVS Pharmacy,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
23,
1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/business/1998/02/23/ultimately-a-healthy-decision-at-giant-and-cvspharmacy/d96ffe44-b944-437e-874f-3d31593b94d5/?utm_term=.d587a5895e0d.
226
Weld, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 261, at 16.
227
Id. at 14.
218
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of privacy “that is both unreasonable and substantial or serious,” as
required under the Massachusetts privacy statute.228
Later, in 2007 a superior court in Massachusetts dismissed a
plaintiff’s claim in a similar case. In Kelley v. CVS,229 CVS had an
arrangement with Merck & Co., Inc. to mail letters that had been
approved by Merck to CVS customers who had filled certain
prescriptions.230 CVS identified, based on prescription records,
which customers should receive Merck’s letters and then CVS
again contracted Elensys (a third-party) to prepare and send letters
to the identified customers.231 The plaintiff filled a prescription for
diabetes medication, received one such letter,232 and sued for
privacy rights violation.233 In sustaining the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on this count, the court found that there was no
showing of substantial or serious interference with the plaintiff’s
privacy.234 In part, this was because the plaintiff had already
disclosed his diabetes condition to several people, making no
secret of it.235 In addition, Elensys received no information from
CVS about the plaintiff’s diagnosis or condition.236
2.

State Common Law
States’ approaches to common law invasion of privacy lack
uniformity. Further complicating this area of law, some states’
privacy legislation has preempted common law invasion of privacy
claims.237 Traditionally, courts have referenced the four types of
invasion of privacy actions, in line with those identified by Prosser
in 2d Restatement of Torts: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of a person’s name or
228

Id.
No. 98-0897-BLS2, 2007 Mass. Super. LEXIS 381 (Mass. Aug. 24, 2007).
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id. at 2.
233
Id. at 4.
234
Id. at 5.
235
Id. at 7.
236
Id. at 6.
237
See Weld, supra note 218, at 21 (stating that a tortious misappropriation
claim “is probably preempted by” the Massachusetts privacy statute); see also
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (2016) (privacy statute).
229
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likeness (3) publication of private facts; and (4) publication of facts
which place a person in a false light. Some, but not all, states
recognize all four types of privacy invasion.238 A few jurisdictions,
such as Massachusetts239 and Maryland,240 recognize a cause of
action for negligent invasion of privacy, but others, like Michigan,
require intent.241 Of the four types, only unreasonable intrusion
upon a person’s seclusion and publication of private facts are
potential candidates for invasion of informational consumer health
privacy discussed here. “Publicity” in this context means
“communicating the matter to the public at large or to so many
persons that the matter must be regarded as one of general
knowledge.”242 We examine cases involving online activity leading
to the transfer of information to third parties and claims of
intrusion on seclusion and public disclosure of private facts claims
in this section.
Courts have distinguished facts that are private from those that
are personal243; a fact must be “private” to succeed under an
invasion of privacy claim. For purposes of invasion of privacy
claims, matters of public record, such as name, address, date of
birth and marriage, are not private.244 In Busse v. Motorola245 a
238

Illinois, for example, recognizes all four types. Cooney v. Chi. Pub.
Schs., 943 N.E.2d 23, 31–32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (quoting Busse v. Motorola,
Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). New York, however,
recognizes only misappropriation as a basis for invasion of privacy claims.
Gaeta v. Home Box Office, 645 N.Y.S.2d 707, 707 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1996).
239
See Barnes v. Town of Webster, No. 04-2420, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS
480, at *3–4 (Mass. Oct. 11, 2005).
240
See Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 687 A.2d 1375, 1380–81 (Md. 1997).
241
In a class action suit, the medical records of a group of 159 patients
accidentally became available on the internet and “Google’s automated web
crawler . . . indexed the information, thereby making it possible to find patient
information through Google’s search engine.” Despite the fact that the
disclosure involved patient medical information, the court ruled that there was
no invasion of privacy because the disclosure was accidental. Doe v. Henry Ford
Health System, 865 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) cert. denied, No.
1509378, 2015 Mich. LEXIS 1995 (2015).
242
Roehrborn v. Lambert, 660 N.E.2d 180, 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
243
Cooney, 943 N.E.2d at 32.
244
Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013, 1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). Other
courts have concluded that names and addresses are not automatically
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cellular phone customer brought a class action alleging, inter alia,
that a cellular phone service company and others intruded on
seclusion by transferring customers’ names, addresses, birthdates,
social security numbers, cellular phone numbers and other
information to a private research firm for studying a possible link
between cell phone use and mortality. In determining only the
element of requiring that intrusion be upon private matters, the
Appellate Court of Illinois held that none of the information
transferred was in fact private.246 In its interpretation of Busse, the
court in Cooney v. Chicago Public Schools stated that the part of
the distinction between personal information and private facts is
that the latter are “facially embarrassing and highly offensive if
disclosed.”247 Even household income, credit limits, credit card
balances and credit purchase history is not necessarily “private” for
purposes of an invasion of privacy claim of intrusion upon
seclusion.248
Other courts have held that social security numbers are
private249 and that “[e]mployees’ family matters, health problems,
and sex lives” are “clearly private.”250 If the plaintiff’s privacy
claim is based on public disclosure of private facts, then it is also

considered public information. In Weld, the Massachusetts Superior Court held
that plaintiffs who were drug store customers “have not similarly relinquished
any expectation of privacy” in their names and addresses the way public school
employees have. Weld v. CVS Pharm., No. 98-0897F, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS
261, at *12 (Mass. June 1, 1999). The United States Supreme Court held that
“[m]erely because [a fact] can be found in a public recor[d] does not mean that it
should receive widespread publicity if it does not involve a matter of public
concern.” United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 n.15 (1989) (quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton
& D. Owens, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts § 117, p. 859 (5th ed. 1984)).
245
Busse, 813 N.E.2d 1013.
246
Id.
247
Cooney, 943 N.E.2d at 32.
248
Bovay v. Sears Robuck & Co., 994 N.E.2d 665, 677–78 (Ill. App. Ct.
2013).
249
Busse, 813 N.E.2d at 1018; City of Kirkland v. Sheehan, No. 01-2-09513-7
SEA, 2000 WL 1751590, 7 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 10, 2001).
250
Johnson v. Kmart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192, 1196–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
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necessary to show that “the intrusion would be highly offensive or
objectionable to a reasonable person.”251
Although intrusion upon seclusion can occur in an
informational setting, plaintiffs invoking this theory in the realm of
consumer privacy have met little success, both in connection with
online information and in more traditional informational settings.
Several courts applying state law have held that the transfer of
consumer information does not constitute an “intrusion” for
purposes of invasion of privacy claims.252 In one case, American
Express rented information about cardholders spending habits.253
Before doing so, it would “rank . . . cardholders into six tiers based
on spending habits . . . [f]or example, a cardholder may be
characterized as ‘Rodeo Drive Chic’ or ‘Value Oriented.’ To
characterize its cardholders, defendants analyze where they shop
and how much they spend, and also consider behavioral
characteristics and spending histories.”254 In this case, the
Appellate Court of Illinois decided that these actions did not rise to
the level of “intrusion” for invasion of privacy purposes.255
Similarly, plaintiffs in In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy
Litigation failed to show intrusion on seclusion when a business
transferred consumer information to a third party.256 There, the
defendant was a large credit reporting agency in the business of
assembling and evaluating consumer credit information and then
selling reports to companies considering extending credit to the
consumer. The defendant was also in the business of selling or
leasing ‘target marketing’ lists to catalog retailers, publication
subscription vendors, and others using both mail and
telemarketing.257 The marketing lists were compiled using the same
database as the credit reporting division. The plaintiff attempted to
251

Busse, 813 N.E.2d at 1017.
In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litigation, 326 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901
(N.D. Ill. 2004); Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995).
253
Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1352–53.
254
Id. at 1353.
255
Id.
256
Trans Union, 326 F. Supp. 2d 893 at 902.
257
Id. at 895–96.
252
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distinguish Dwyer on the grounds that the Dwyer plaintiffs
voluntarily disclosed information directly to the defendant,
whereas Trans Union plaintiffs did not.258 The court rejected the
importance of this distinction, stating that plaintiffs disclosed
information to third-party creditors who then lawfully transferred
the information to the defendants. Further, the court stated,
plaintiffs “do not and cannot allege that they were unaware that
their creditors would pass this information on to Trans Union in
the normal course of business.”259 While it may well be that
plaintiffs knew or should have known that creditors would transfer
their payment histories to credit reporting agencies, it does not
follow that this knowledge equates to consent to any and all
subsequent transfers of that information.
Neither the Busse, Dwyer, nor the Trans Union court makes
any mention of the aggregation aspect of the plaintiff/consumer’s
information. The Trans Union court, in fact, seems unaware of the
transformative power of aggregating data: “Nor are the individual
pieces of information—names, addresses, particulars of cell phone
use—facially revealing, compromising or embarrassing.”260 Indeed,
individual pieces of information taken alone may have de minimis
impact on privacy. However, does the analysis change when
information is data-aggregated to the point where the original
information recipient receives an entire profile that identifies a
customer and discloses information about their behavior?
3.

State Data Privacy Statutes
Frustrated by the failure of the federal government to provide
comprehensive standards for data privacy protection, states have
taken matters into their own hands, as the following representative
examples indicate.
a. Broad Privacy Protections
258

Trans Union, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 901–02. In the technology terms described
in Part I, the plaintiffs were essentially arguing that this was data based on
transactional information, not data voluntarily submitted, for example, by a
survey.
259
Id.
260
Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013, 1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(emphasis added).
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Not surprisingly, California has been at the forefront of state
efforts to protect consumer privacy. Established in 2000, the
California Office of Privacy Protection was created to protect the
privacy rights of consumers.261 When budget cuts closed this office
in 2011, a newly created Privacy Enforcement and Protection Unit
with the Attorney General’s office continued the defunct agency’s
privacy protection efforts.262 This unit enforces both federal and
state privacy laws.
In 2004, California enacted the California Online Privacy
Protection Act of 2003,263 making California the first state to
require a commercial website to post a privacy policy that: (1)
identifies for site users the categories of personally identifiable
information (“PII”) the site collects; (2) indicates the categories of
third parties with whom the information is shared; (3) describes the
process, if any, users can follow to view and edit the PII collected;
and (4) specifies the process by which users will be notified of any
material changes to the policy.264 This law was updated in 2014
with two additional disclosure requirements. The first requires a
website operator that collects PII about an individual to notify
users how the website operator responds to “do not track”
requests.265 Second, the website must also disclose whether third
parties are permitted to collect PII during the user’s site visit.266
In 2015, Delaware followed suit and enacted an online privacy
and protection almost identical to that of California.267 In July
2016, regulations became effective in Delaware that offer to
website operators optional safe harbor language that could be used
261

SCOTT COOPER ET AL., STATE PRIVACY LAWS IN PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY
5-3 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1st ed. 2010).
262
Jennifer Archie, Kevin Boyle & Ghaith Mahmood, California AG’s Office
Establishes Privacy Enforcement Unit, LATHAM & WATKINS GLOBAL PRIVACY
&
SECURITY
COMPLIANCE
LAW
BLOG
(July
20,
2012),
http://www.globalprivacyblog.com/privacy/california-privacy-enforcementunit/.
263
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2004).
264
Id. § 22575(b)(1)–(3).
265
Id. § 22575(b)(5).
266
Id. § 22575(b)(6).
267
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1205C (2016).
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to ensure compliance with the Delaware online privacy laws.268 In
addition, those regulations indicate that if a website operator has a
privacy policy that complies with the requirements of the
California Online Privacy Protection Act, the safe harbor will be
satisfied.269 The Delaware privacy statute’s definition of
“personally identifiable information” includes most commonly
items such as name, address, social security number, and email
address that independently or in combination with other identifiers
could be personally identifiable.270 But in its safe harbor
regulations, greater clarity is offered in the description of the
notification requirements for the kinds of information that the
website might collect from a user, which include:
Information about your device or computer, including your IP address,
geolocation, browser type, browser version, device type, operating
system, referring [site/service/application].
Information about your visits to and use of the site/service/application,
including how you use the site/service/application, such as describe the
type of information—examples might include the timing, length,
frequency, and pattern of use, and the pages, screens, or other displays
of information looked at by the user.271

If our patient Pamela is to find any relief within the law, it
appears that her relief is most likely to be found in a state privacy
statute, such as that of Delaware, that contains specific language
that addresses how to handle information collected online about a
user.
b. Deceptive Trade Practice
All states have enacted some form of consumer protection law
prohibiting deceptive trade practices, but there is variation in terms
of extent of protections, enforcement mechanisms, and penalties
for violations.272 In some states, violations of a stated company
privacy policy are within deceptive trade practice prohibitions.
268

6-100-104 DEL. ADMIN. CODE (2016).
Id. § 5.0 (2016).
270
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1202(c)(15) (2016).
271
6-100-104 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 4.2.2 (2016).
272
CAROLYN L. CARTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, A 50-STATE
REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES (2009),
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf.
269
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Nebraska, for example, does not impose specific obligations on
website in terms of what privacy protections must be provided to
consumers, but under state law a website owner may be guilty of a
deceptive trade practice if that operator “knowingly makes a false
or misleading statement in a privacy policy, published on the
Internet or otherwise distributed or published, regarding the use of
personal information submitted by members of the public.”273
Pennsylvania law contains a similar provision.274 As per statute, a
person commits a deceptive or fraudulent business practice if in the
course of business such person, “knowingly makes a false or
misleading statement in a privacy policy, published on the Internet
or otherwise distributed or published, regarding the use of personal
information submitted by members of the public.”275
c. ISPs and Confidentiality
In Nevada, Internet service providers are required to keep
confidential “[a]ll information concerning a subscriber other than
the electronic mail address of the subscriber, unless the subscriber
gives permission, in writing or by electronic mail, to the provider
of the Internet service to disclose the information.”276 Similarly, in
Minnesota, subject to certain exceptions, ISPs may not “knowingly
disclose personally identifiable information concerning a consumer
of the Internet service provider.”277 If the disclosure is incidental to
the ordinary course of business of the ISP, disclosure may be
permissible278 as is a disclosure made with the consent of the
user.279 Minnesota law defines personally identifiable information
to include information that identifies “[i]nternet or online sites

273

NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-302(a)(15) (2017).
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4107(a)(10) (2016).
275
Id.
276
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.498(1) (LexisNexis 2016).
277
MINN. STAT. § 325M.02 (2016).
278
MINN. STAT. § 325M.04, Subd. 1(1) (2016). Though seemingly broad, this
is intended to include only “debt-collection activities, order fulfillment, request
processing, or the transfer of ownership.” See Jordan M. Blanke, Minnesota
Passes the Nation’s First Internet Privacy Law, 29 RUTGERS U. COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 405, 411 (2003).
279
MINN. STAT. § 325M.04, Subd. 1(3) (2016).
274
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visited by a consumer, or any of the contents of a consumer’s datastorage devices.”280
Utah law does not restrict the transfer of an individual’s
personal information but instead requires a commercial entity that
either intends to or wants the ability to disclose that nonpublic
information to a third party for compensation, to notify the
consumer either orally in writing that the entity “[m]ay choose to
disclose nonpublic personal information about you, the consumer,
to a third party for compensation.”281 Such notice should be
sufficiently noticeable so that the consumer would see it before
providing any nonpublic information to the entity.282
IV. THE TRACKING OF HEALTH-RELATED SEARCHES IS NOT
WITHIN THE PROTECTIONS PROVIDED BY HIPAA
Having concluded that existing federal and state authority
provides limited to no protection for our user’s search of
information related to high cholesterol, Part IV considers whether
protection can be found instead in the privacy rules contained in
HIPAA. While the health records maintained by hospitals, doctors’
offices, and insurance companies are clearly within HIPAA’s
mandates,283 what is less certain is the status of health-related
queries potentially traceable back to and incorporated in the online
profile of an identifiable individual. To reach a conclusion on this
question, we begin with a look at HIPAA’s genesis, the Act’s
stated requirements, and interpretations of those requirements.
A. The Origins of HIPAA Highlight the Importance of Health
Information Privacy
Starting in or around 1929, Baylor University permitted local
schoolteachers to pay insurance premiums to cover any medical
expenses incurred at its university hospital in Dallas, Texas,
thereby giving birth to the modern private health insurance
280
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industry.284 While other hospitals were quick to adopt similar
insurance mechanisms, it was not until the late 1940s that
commercial insurance companies entered the health insurance
market. The commercial insurance companies’ delayed entry into
the health insurance market stems from two interrelated reasons: 1)
whether medical care was an insurable risk since no clear model
could accurately predict losses and 2) how to profitably price
premiums when losses are not accurately predictable.285
In this early insurance market environment, health insurers
were asymmetrically informed about insurance buyers’ health
status. Buyers’ private health information provided different
motivations to seek health insurance and impact the functioning of
a competitive insurance market. For simplicity, suppose two pools
of individuals exist in the health-insurance market: (1) high-risk
individuals who have an unhealthy predisposition—either from
genetics or lifestyle; and (2) low-risk individuals with no unhealthy
predisposition. At one extreme, the market exhibits adverse
selection: knowing more about their health status, low-risk
individuals will likely choose not to seek health insurance (selfinsure) leaving the health-insurance market comprised primarily of
high-risk individuals.286 Lacking individuals’ private health
information, health insurers set high premiums and historically
excluded individuals from obtaining health-insurance coverage
resulting in a market failure in the insurance market.287
Ideally, commercial health insurers seek to separate the pools
of insurance buyers according to health risk in order to charge
high-risk individuals high premiums and low-risk individual low
premiums. However, at least two factors confound insurers’ ability
284
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to separate insurance buyers: (1) health uncertainty and (2)
consumers’ private health information. Lacking private health
information on the market composition insurees, health insurers
likely misprice premiums resulting in sub-optimal profit and
potential market failure. While some empirical evidence suggests
that adverse selection in insurance markets in general is grossly
exaggerated, this possibility cannot be safely ignored.288
To mitigate negative health adverse selection risk, insurers
attempt to acquire information to screen individuals or groups and
set premiums according to the expected medical benefits payout.289
Screening through the practice of community rating methods
attempt to set insurance premiums according to insurance plan
member risk characteristics.290 Premiums can vary by individuals
under community-based rating methods due to geographic
location, cost-of-living, contract type, and plan design. In contrast,
experience rating methods screen individuals, or groups of
individuals, according to personally identifiable risk categories
thereby more closely matching insurance premiums to risk and
expected medical benefit payouts to insurees.291 Like communitybased rating, premiums based on experience rating methods can be
based on geographical location, contract type, and plan design. An
individual’s historical health data can also help insurers better
understand the relationship between risk categories and expected
health care costs to insure an individual or groups of individuals.292
Health screening and experience rating help insurers mitigate
the adverse selection problem in the health insurance market.
Therefore, health insurers have incentives to invest in acquiring as
much private health information on insurees as possible to guide
setting premiums and determining coverage eligibility. Insurers’
incentives to mitigate the adverse selection problem leaves high288
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289
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risk insurees in vulnerable situations, potentially with no option to
acquire health insurance coverage. In 1996, President Bill Clinton
signed the HIPAA legislation into law with the goals of ensuring
the availability of health coverage and protecting patient privacy.293
B. The Privacy Rule of HIPAA
HIPAA was enacted in part to ensure that health insurance
would be portable—meaning that individuals would be able to
maintain their health insurance between jobs—and that patient
health information294 would be secure and private,295 especially in
the context of the computerization of patients’ medical records.
The primary concern for the purposes of this article are the
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information (“Privacy Rule”)296 as enacted by the Department of
Health and Human Services in accordance with HIPAA’s privacy
mandate. This Privacy Rule represents the first set of national
regulations that protect certain health information.297 The preamble
to these standards illustrates the need for the Privacy Rule:
According to the American Health Information Management
Association (AHIMA), an average of 150 people, “from nursing staff to
X-ray technicians, to billing clerks” have access to a patient’s medical
293
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294
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records during the course of a typical hospitalization. While many of
these individuals have a legitimate need to see all or a part of a
patient’s records, no laws govern who those people are, what
information they are able to see, and what they are and are not allowed
to do with that information once they have access to it.298

The Privacy Rule applies to health plans and health care
providers and “any health care provider that transmits health
information in electronic form.”299 It was designed to ensure that
entities covered by this rule could only provide non-covered
entities access to an individual’s protected health information
(“PHI”)300 if the individual authorized that disclosure.301 However,
the new rule also built in exceptions that would allow health care
professionals to carry out their business functions; for example,
PHI could be exchanged with non-covered business associates in
connection with treatment, payment, and health care
authorization.302 HIPAA initially defined a business associate as
one “who performs functions or activities on behalf of, or provides
certain services to, a covered entity that involve access by the
business associate to protected health information.”303 When a
covered entity contracts with other businesses to perform some of
their functions, the law mandates that the contractual relationship
ensures that the business associate maintains the privacy of the

298
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PHI.304 In 2009, Congress passed the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH”) to
expand the scope and reach of HIPAA.305 HITECH broadened the
definition of a business associate to “include any subcontractor, ad
infinitum, ‘that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected
health information on behalf of the business associate.’ This
amendment vastly increased the number of entities subject to
HIPAA.”306
Taken together, HIPAA and HITECH require that when
unsecured health information is breached, the covered entity or the
business associate must notify the individuals affected and the
Secretary of Health and Human Services of the breach.307 Aware
that many web-based businesses that collect individual health
information may not be covered by the terms of HIPAA, in 2010
the FTC passed the Health Breach Notification Rule to mandate
that certain entities not covered by HIPAA notify customers (and
sometimes the media) of any breach of their “unsecured,
individually identifiable electronic health information.”308 The
scope of the rule is broad, applying to businesses that are (1)
vendors309 of personal health records (“PHR”),310 (2) a PHR-related

304
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entity, or (3) a third-party service provider for the entities in
categories 1 and 2.311
Seeking to offer clarity in terms of the types of entities that will
be considered a PHR-related entity, the FTC offered the following
example:
For example, if you have an app that helps consumers manage their
medications or lets them upload readings from a device like a blood
pressure cuff or a pedometer into a personal health record, your
business is a PHR-related entity. However, if consumers can simply
input their own information on your site in a way that doesn’t interact
with personal health records offered by a vendor - for example if your
site allows consumers to input their weight each week to track their
fitness goals-you’re not a PHR-related entity.312

A violation of the health breach notification rule is treated “as
an unfair or deceptive act or practice,” and violators may be
penalized up to $40,000 per violation.313
C. Health-Related Searches as PHI?
A review of the statutory language of HIPAA in combination
with the privacy protections implemented by Privacy Rule of the
DHS leads to the conclusion that in and of itself Pamela’s search of
“women and high cholesterol,” “cholesterol-lowering drugs,” and
“coronary artery disease” cannot bring a search engine within the
“covered entity” and “business associate” classifications of
HIPAA.314 The question of whether health-related searches might
fall within PHI becomes more nuanced when that search is
potentially being combined with other information gleaned from
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the user’s online activities which when aggregated yield a profile
that can be traced back to a specific individual.315
While still not within the letter of the law, there is a question
whether the capture and aggregation of health-related searches or
other health-related information gathered online violate the spirit
of HIPAA. HIPAA was designed, in part, to ensure that patient
health information remained confidential. HIPAA acknowledges
the importance of patient control over whom this information is
shared with. When Pamela searched for women and high
cholesterol, she was searching for her diagnosed medical
condition, and to the extent that her search became part of an
online profile used by website owners for any one of the purposes
discussed in Part II, this use and exchange of information without
her consent, and possibly to her economic detriment, would violate
the spirit of HIPAA’s privacy protection. The issue becomes
murkier if Pamela searches the internet inputting information that
is not hers, but someone else’s. For example, suppose she searched
“treatment for tumors of the pituitary gland,” not because she has
that condition, but because her best friend was just diagnosed and
she wants to research in order to better support her friend. If a
pituitary gland tumor becomes part of the user’s online profile, this
would appear to be outside the spirit of HIPAA as this information
is not personal health information regarding the computer user.
The conclusion that a search engine, such as Google, or a
website owner, such as WebMD, is not currently impeded in its
tracking, aggregation, and use of a user’s online activity highlights
the critical need for privacy law reform that will, at a minimum,
315

It has been shown that 87% of Americans can be identified using only three
types of information: zip code, birthdate, and gender, and the idea that some
information (such as a web browser search) cannot be personal is not accurate
since “almost all information can be personal when combined with other relevant
bits of data.” Nate Anderson, “Anonymized” Data Really Isn’t - and Why Not,
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 8, 2009), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/09/yoursecrets-live-online-in-databases-of-ruin/; see also Scott Berinato, There’s No Such
Thing as Anonymous Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 9, 2015),
https://hbr.org/2015/02/theres-no-such-thing-as-anonymous-data (anonymization
is becoming increasingly difficult due to the availability of large metadata
datasets).

OCT. 2017]

Health Privacy

65

offer protection for an unsuspecting computer user’s health-related
actions.
V. LEGISLATION LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THIRD-PARTY
TRACKING IS NEEDED
Any legislative or regulatory initiative must recognize, as a
starting point, the legitimate interests of businesses to use certain
customer information as part of confidential information and trade
secret-protected assets. Fundamentally, as described in Part II,
information, including customer information, is valuable and
integral to the workings and decision-making of businesses.
Business interests must be balanced against the individual
customer’s reasonable expectations of privacy in connection with
health-related data online. We propose the following as a sensible
scheme designed to protect both these interests.
As explained in Part III, attempts at comprehensive online
privacy legislation have repeatedly stalled in Congress. Efforts at
industry self-regulation have not fared much better. The nowrepealed regulations that the FCC released in October 2016 likely
resulted from Congressional inaction in this area coupled with an
awareness that some action must be taken at the federal level as
technological advances present a greater threat to online privacy.
Recognizing that comprehensive online privacy legislation is
not likely to be passed in the short term, we propose instead
targeted legislation to address the most egregious of the various
uses of individual information described in this paper. Specifically,
we advocate controlling the practice of indiscriminate collection,
transfer, storage, and aggregation of individual health-related
information obtained through internet searching, through visiting
health-related content on websites that rely on third-party ad
exchanges to generate revenue using third-party tracking, and
through other tracking technologies that can identify an individual
or household with high probability. Legislation should prohibit
such uses unless informed users consent in advance.316
316

Recall that in the pending lawsuit against Google, see supra Introduction,
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This proposal achieves the twin objectives of maintaining
business stability and respecting the privacy of an individual’s
health data. There would be minimal disruption to business.
Companies like Google, for example, would not need to change
their business model.317 They could continue to use first-party
information based on voluntary provisions of information;
transactional data; and first-party tracking that does relate
aggregated health-related data to an individual or household with
high probability. They also could continue to connect their website
users to advertising for all non-health purposes. First-party healthrelated advertisement could be provided as long as (1) aggregated
health data is not related to an individual or household or (2)
information could not be transferred to third parties without
adequate disclosure and user opt-in.
This type of targeted legislation would be a step in the right
direction. It would allow the law to keep pace with technology,
which is now able to use individual items of data in ways that
computer users have likely never envisioned. As Congress
embarks on this path, it follows the lead of the European Union
Commission which seeks to ensure that “European legislation is
keeping up with the fast space [sic] at which IT-based services are
developing and evolving.”318 Indeed, Europe has been recognized
as a world leader in efforts to protect individual data.319 For
example, on January 10, 2017 the European Commission released
consent would mean that at a minimum, users should be told that “participation
is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to
which the [user] is otherwise entitled, and the [user] may discontinue
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the [user] is
otherwise entitled.” See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (8) (2016).
317
In fact, as per the terms of Google’s stated privacy policy, Google requires
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(last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
318
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a Proposal for a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic
Communications, which, among other things, requires that web
browsers obtain opt-in consent from end users in order to engage
in third party tracking.320 As per an already existing European
Directive,321 this consent should take the form of “a clear,
affirmative action from the end-user of terminal equipment to
signify his or her freely given, specific informed, and unambiguous
agreement to the storage and access of such cookies in and from
the terminal equipment.”322
CONCLUSION
The above-recommended privacy protections support the
reasonable expectations of privacy held by many consumers and
internet users with minimal negative impact on businesses. This
alone is sufficient to justify such targeted legislation. In the larger
context, the US government has articulated how the benefits of
privacy protection extend beyond the individual:
Strong privacy protections also are critical to sustaining the trust that
nurtures Internet commerce and fuels innovation. Trust means the
companies and technical systems on which we depend meet our
expectations for privacy, security, and reliability. In addition, United
States leadership in consumer data privacy can help establish more
flexible, innovation-enhancing privacy models among our international
partners.323

This targeted legislation will protect privacy while strengthening
and further developing e-commerce in the twenty-first century.
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